Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 554-580

  Claessens, Stijn ^a,b,c   Feijen, Erik ^d   Laeven, Luc ^a,c  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Campaign contributions; Corruption; Elections; Preferential lending

Indexed keywords

EID: 46049105914     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.003     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Acemoglu, D., 2007. The form of property rights: oligarchic vs. democratic societies. Mimeo. Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.
2. Ansolabehere S., Snyder J., and Ueda M. Campaign finance regulations and the return on investment from campaign contributions. Mimeo (2004), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
3. Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Schoar A., and Thesmar D. Politically connected CEOs and corporate outcomes: evidence from France. Mimeo (2004), University of Chicago, Chicago, IL
4. Coate S. Pareto-improving finance policy. American Economic Review 94 (2004) 628-655
5. Chappell H. Campaign contributions and congressional voting: a simultaneous Probit-Tobit model. Review of Economics and Statistics 64 (1982) 77-83
6. Charumilind C., Kali R., and Wiwattanakantang Y. Connected lending: Thailand before the financial crisis. Journal of Business 79 (2006) 181-218
7. Cole S. Fixing market failures or fixing elections? Agricultural credit in India. Mimeo (2004), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
8. Dinc S. Politicians and banks: political influences on government-owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 453-479
9. Durden G., and Silberman J. Determining legislative preferences for the minimum wage: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 84 (1976) 317-329
10. Faccio M. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96 (2006) 369-386
11. Faccio M., and Parsley D. Sudden deaths: taking stock of political connections. Mimeo (2006), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN
12. Ferguson, T., Voth, H., 2005. Betting on Hitler: the value of political connections in Nazi Germany. Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
13. Fisman R. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91 (2001) 1095-1102
14. Fisman D., Fisman R., Galef J., and Khurana R. Estimating the value of connections to Vice President Cheney. Mimeo (2006), Columbia University, New York, NY
15. Grenzke J. PACs and the congressional supermarket: the currency is complex. American Journal of Political Science 33 (1989) 1-24
16. Grossman G., and Helpman E. Electoral competition and special interest politics. Review of Economic Studies 63 (1996) 265-286
17. Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 2005. Dados eleitorais do Brasil. 〈http://www.iuperj.br/〉.
18. International Foundation for Election Systems, 2005. 〈http://www.electionguide.org〉.
19. Jayachandran S. The Jeffords effect. Mimeo (2004), University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA
20. Johnson S., and Mitton T. Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Economics 67 (2003) 351-382
21. Kroszner R., and Stratmann T. Interest-group competition and the organization of Congress: theory and evidence from financial services' political action committees. American Economic Review 88 (1998) 1163-1187
22. Krueger A. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64 (1974) 291-303
23. Khwaja A., and Mian A. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005) 1371-1411
24. La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., and Shleifer A. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance 57 (2002) 265-301
25. MacKinlay C. Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997) 13-39
26. Morck R., Wolfenzon D., and Yeung B. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature 43 (2005) 655-720
27. Rajan R., and Zingales L. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (1995) 1421-1460
28. Rajan R., and Zingales L. The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the 20th century. Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003) 5-50
29. Ramalho R. The effects of an anti-corruption campaign: evidence from the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil. Mimeo (2003), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
30. Reuters, 1998. Final results for Brazilian general election. October 9.
31. Reuters, 2002. Final results for Brazilian general election. October 8.
32. Roberts B. A dead senator tells no lies: seniority and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science 34 (1990) 31-58
33. Samuels, D., 1998. Careerism and its consequences: federalism, elections, and policy-making in Brazil. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California at San Diego, San Diego, CA.
34. Samuels D. Does money matter? Credible commitments and campaign finance in new democracies: theory and evidence from Brazil. Comparative Politics 34 (2001) 23-42
35. Samuels D. Pork barreling is not credit claiming or advertising: campaign finance and the sources of the personal vote in Brazil. Journal of Politics 64 (2002) 845-863
36. Shon, J., 2006. Do stock return vary with campaign contributions? The Bush versus Gore 2000 presidential elections, Unpublished working paper. City University of New York, New York, NY.
37. Snyder J. Campaign contributions as investments: the US House of Representatives, 1980-1986. Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 1195-1227
38. Stratmann T. Campaign contributions and congressional voting: does the timing of contributions matter?. Review of Economics and Statistics 771 (1995) 127-136
39. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2005. 〈http://www.tse.gov.br/〉.
40. Veja, 1998. Castigo Rápido. August 12, 45.
41. White H. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48 (1980) 817-838