The politics of government investment

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 24-48

  Duchin, Ran ^a   Sosyura, Denis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bailout; Contributions; Lobbying; Political connections; TARP

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864977590     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.009     Document Type: Article

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