Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks' response to government aid

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 1-28

  Duchin, Ran ^a   Sosyura, Denis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bailout; Banking; Financial crisis; Lending; Moral hazard; Risk; TARP

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900459314     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.005     Document Type: Article

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