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Volumn 25, Issue 8, 2012, Pages 2343-2380

Bank bailouts and moral hazard: Evidence from Germany

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EID: 84864487874     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs056     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (301)

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