Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: Preventing bank panics without moral hazard

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 197-211

  Martin, Antoine ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank panics; Deposit insurance; Liquidity provision; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 22144473361     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x     Document Type: Article

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