Bank bailouts: Moral hazard vs. value effect

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 300-330

  Cordella, Tito ^a   Yeyati, Eduardo Levy ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Bailout; Banks; Lender of last resort; Moral hazard; Risk; Value effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344585888     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1042-9573(03)00046-9     Document Type: Article

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