Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring

Review of Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 571-602

  Gropp, Reint ^a   Vesala, Jukka ^a  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23944444239     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10679-004-6280-0     Document Type: Article

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