Family, Wealth, and Governance: An Agency Account

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 39, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 1281-1303

  Zellweger, Thomas ^a   Kammerlander, Nadine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945477638     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/etap.12182     Document Type: Article

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