Chevron and deference in state administrative law

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 555-585

  Saiger, Aaron ^a  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84938860322     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (138)

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4. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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25. 735 A.2d 378 (Del. 1999).
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28. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
29. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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45. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984);
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48. F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 538 (2000).
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50. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
51. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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53. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 957 (1980),
54. Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679 (2014);
55. Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 299 (2006);
56. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759-60 (2007);
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58. Neal D. Woods & Michael Baranowski, Governors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources As Sources of Administrative Influence, 30 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1219, 1221 (2007).
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60. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
61. JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 204-05 (2002).
62. David Montgomery, Slowed Elsewhere, Tea Party Still Wields Considerable Sway in Texas Races, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2014, at A9.
63. LARRY J. SABATO, GOOD-BYE TO GOOD-TIME CHARLIE 63-65 (2d ed. 1983).
64. Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1700 (2009).
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66. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2458-60 (2006).
67. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
68. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
69. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 6 (Thomas H. Little & David B. Ogle eds. 2006).
70. Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 25 (2003).
71. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
72. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999);
73. Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 579-80 (1994).
74. Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 923 (2006).
75. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
76. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637 & n.17 (2003);
77. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
78. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 283 n.74 (2012).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
80. Manuel H. Hernandez, Running Out of Gas: Why Texas Must Distance Itself Completely From the Chevron Doctrine of Administrative Deference, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 225, 229-30 (2012).
81. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 508(a)(3)(C) (2010).
82. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 5-116(c)(8) (1981).
83. John Gedid, Modernizing Agency Practice: The 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L.J. 697, 704 (2011).
84. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 508 cmt. (2010).
85. William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979 (2004)).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10141(e) (2003).
87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8)(a) (2013).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West 2008).
89. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
90. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 28.
91. MO. CONST. art. 5, § 18;
92. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 22
93. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Michigan, 754 N.W.2d 259, 265-67 (Mich. 2008).
94. Neal D. Woods, Political Influence on Agency Rule Making: Examining the Effects of Legislative and Gubernatorial Rule Review Powers, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 174, 174 (2004).
95. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-9-106 (2013).
96. Dennis O. Grady & Kathleen M. Simon, Political Restraints and Bureaucratic Discretion: The Case of State Government Rule Making, 30 POL. & POL'Y 646, 649-54 (2002);
97. Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 873, 875-81 (2000);
98. NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1(2);
99. N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, ¶ 6 (similar).
100. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 702 cmt. (2010);
101. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 702(b)(1) (2010).
102. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
103. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 703 cmt. (2010).
104. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2007);
105. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 540-41 (1992).
106. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 703 & cmt. (2010);
107. H. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 82-84 (1982).
108. Blank v. Dep't of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530, 538-39 (Mich. 2000);
109. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 441 (1989).
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111. Steven J. Balla, Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (1998).
112. This is true a fortiori in those states whose rules review procedures extend to already enacted rules.
113. Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Moneyball for State Regulators, NAT'L AFFAIRS (forthcoming).
114. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993);
115. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011);
116. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1768-69 (2013).
117. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2014).
118. L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules in Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 84-85 & n.25 (1982)
119. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3-202(a) (1981).
120. HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-3(c) (West 2008);
121. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-908 (LexisNexis 2012).
122. Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1116 (2006).
123. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1270 (2006);
124. Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447, 464 (2014);
125. A worked-out specification of this game would be of great interest but must be left to future work.
126. D. Zachary Hudson, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119 YALE L.J. 373, 379 & n.24 (2009).
127. Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 456 (2014).
128. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2075-76 (2008).
129. DONALD F. KETTL, THE REGULATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 12-14 (2d ed. 1987).
130. John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 144 (1990).
131. James E. Skok, Federal Funds and State Legislatures: Executive-Legislative Conflict in State Government, in STATE POLITICS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Marilyn Gittell ed., 1986).
132. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 779-80 (2004).
133. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 239-40 (2003).
134. As I have noted, because Chevron is multivalent, it does not lose its appeal if, as many have argued, it is deficient in aspects of its analysis as applied to federal institutions.
135. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 612-13 (2014);
136. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
137. Robert J. McGrath, Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy Across the U.S. States, 13 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 373, 374 (2013).
138. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.