Chevron deference, the rule of law, and presidential influence in the administrative state

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 679-702

  Shane, Peter M ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84935924884     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (86)

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3. LISA SCHULZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 141-42 (2010).
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5. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879
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9. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
10. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014).
11. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002).
12. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1675 n.92 (2004).
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16. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
17. Originally, the hard look doctrine required courts to ensure that the agency had taken a hard look at the regulatory issues. Over time, however, the D.C. Circuit morphed the hard look doctrine "into one that required a hard look not just by the agency, but by the court as well." As now - D.C. Circuit Judge Garland recognized, the D.C. Circuit developed three iterations of its hard look doctrine: procedural, quasi-procedural, and substantive hard look. Regardless of who was required to do the hard looking, in each of these three iterations, the D.C. Circuit's hard look doctrine gave courts much more authority to invalidate agency action than the rational basis review originally contemplated by the APA - and no variant of the hard look doctrine was linked to the doctrines for judicial review of congressional action.
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21. 20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
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30. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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33. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (5th ed. 2013).
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36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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41. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).
42. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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44. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827).
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47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
48. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1802).
49. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
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52. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
53. National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 41 F.3d 721, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
54. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 550 (1985).
55. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637-40.
56. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005).
57. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside - An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 995 (2013).
58. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2025-34 (2011).
59. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2013).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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64. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 204.
65. Jason Marisam, The President's Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 821, 853-54 (2013).
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67. JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1-3 (1986).
68. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 615-17 & nn.73-78 (1989).
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1.
70. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., for William J. Haynes, II Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense Re: The President's Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 4 (March 13, 2002),
71. Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Memorandum for the Files Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2009).
72. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
75. Emily Hammond, Chevron's Generality Principles, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 655, 677 (2014).
76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
77. B. DAN WOOD, THE MYTH OF PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATION (2009).
78. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
80. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006).
81. Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive Approach to Synthesizing Chevron and Mead, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 24 (2005).
82. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 n.15 (2009);
83. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005).
84. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
85. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580 (June 11, 1979).
86. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 312.