Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro-foundations of buyer- supplier relationships

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 36, Issue 8, 2015, Pages 1146-1163

  Obloj, Tomasz ^a   Zemsky, Peter ^b  

^a HEC PARIS   (France)

^b INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

agency theory; moral hazard; organizational incentives; rivalry; value based strategy

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY; RISK MANAGEMENT;

AGENCY THEORY; MORAL HAZARD; ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES; RIVALRY; VALUE-BASED STRATEGIES;

SALES;

EID: 84936986182     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2271     Document Type: Article

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