Organizational structure and the limits of knowledge sharing: Incentive conflict and agency in car leasing

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1106-1121

  Pierce, Lamar ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Automotive industry; Knowledge based view; Leasing; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

AGENCY COSTS; AGENCY THEORY; CAR MODELS; CONFLICTING INCENTIVES; DATA SETS; KNOWLEDGE BENEFITS; KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEWS; KNOWLEDGE-SHARING; LEASING; MARKET CONDITION; ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS; ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES; PRODUCT LIFE CYCLES; SHARE KNOWLEDGE; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; MANAGEMENT; MANAGERS; MODEL AUTOMOBILES; PROFITABILITY;

INTEGRATION;

EID: 84862681122     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1472     Document Type: Article

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