Group cooperation without group selection: Modest punishment can recruit much cooperation

PLoS ONE

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2015, Pages

  Krasnow, Max M ^a   Delton, Andrew W ^b   Cosmides, Leda ^c   Tooby, John ^c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; FREE RIDER PROBLEM; GROUP COOPERATION; GROUP DYNAMICS; GROUP SIZE; HUMAN; INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION; LABOR RECRUITMENT; NAMED GROUPS OF PERSONS; PUNISHER; PUNISHMENT; SIMULATION; SOCIAL ASPECTS AND RELATED PHENOMENA; SOCIAL ECOLOGY; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL PROBLEM; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; GROUP PROCESS; HUMAN RELATION; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; PROBABILITY; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT;

EID: 84929483816     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0124561     Document Type: Article

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