Revisiting "The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups": Continuous reciprocity in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 264, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 188-196

  Takezawa, Masanori ^a,b   Price, Michael E ^c  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^c BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Assortative interaction; Collective action; Evolution of cooperation; Reciprocal altruism; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ADAPTATION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; MODELING; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; HUMAN RELATION; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DISTRIBUTION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION RESEARCH; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RECIPROCITY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

ALGORITHMS; ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SOCIAL DESIRABILITY;

EID: 77951653092     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.028     Document Type: Article

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