Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games

Biology Letters

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2014, Pages

  Sasaki, Tatsuya ^a,b   Uchida, Satoshi ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^c Research Center   (Japan)

Author keywords

Coordination problem; Evolution of cooperation; Public good game; Punishment; Reward

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; PUBLIC GOODS; RISK PERCEPTION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 84893878433     PISSN: 17449561     EISSN: 1744957X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903     Document Type: Article

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