When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation?

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 276, Issue 1659, 2009, Pages 1167-1174

  Mathew, Sarah ^a   Boyd, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruistic punishment; Evolution of cooperation; Optional participation

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION;

EID: 60049099575     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1623     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. 1981 The evolution of cooperation. Science 211,1390-1396.
2. Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. 2003 The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 100, 3531-3535.
3. Brandt, H., Hauert, C. & Sigmund, K. 2006 Punishing and abstaining for public goods. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 103, 495-497.
4. Fehr, E. & Gachter, S. 2000 Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980-994.
5. Fowler, J. H. 2005 Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 102, 7047-7049.
6. Hamilton, W. D. 1963 The evolution of altruistic behavior. Am. Nat. 97, 354-356.
7. Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. 2002 Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science 296, 1129-1132.
8. Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. 2007 Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science 316, 1905-1907.
9. Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. 2001 Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol. 208, 79-89.
10. Henrich, J. et al. 2006 Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767-1770.
11. Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H. J. 2002 Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'. Nature 415, 424-426.
12. Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. 2004 Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432, 499-502.
13. Trivers, R. L. 1971 The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35-57.