Non-executive employee ownership and corporate risk

Accounting Review

Volumn 90, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 115-145

  Bova, Francesco ^a   Kolev, Kalin ^b   Thomas, Jacob K ^b   Zhang, X Frank ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Employee compensation; Employee ownership; Executive compensation; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928801513     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr-50860     Document Type: Article

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