Corporate governance reform and executive incentives: Implications for investments and risk taking

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 1296-1332

  Cohen, Daniel A ^a   Dey, Aiyesha ^b   Lys, Thomas z ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85027941901     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01189.x     Document Type: Article

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