Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 70-88

  Armstrong, Christopher S ^a   Vashishtha, Rahul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Equity incentives; Executive compensation; Hedging; Risk taking incentives; Systematic and idiosyncratic risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857457665     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.11.005     Document Type: Article

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