Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 103, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 588-610

  Cassell, Cory A ^a   Huang, Shawn X ^a   Manuel Sanchez, Juan ^a   Stuart, Michael D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO incentives; Deferred compensation; Inside debt; Pensions; Risk seeking behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855494276     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.008     Document Type: Article

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