The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high-technology firms

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 872-889

  Lim, Elizabeth N K ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

board vigilance; CEO duality; CEO pay; reference point; risk taking

Indexed keywords

RISK MANAGEMENT;

BOARD VIGILANCE; CEO DUALITY; CEO PAY; REFERENCE POINTS; RISK TAKING;

DECISION THEORY;

EID: 84928558574     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2252     Document Type: Article

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