Dual-Process Theories of Deductive Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies

The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Evans St , Jonathan B T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Deductive reasoning; Dual process theory; Inference

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925053287     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0008     Document Type: Chapter

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