On the intrinsic value of pleasures

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 448-466

  Feldman, Fred ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001938305     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233744     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. Henry Sidgwick discusses the concept of pleasure in various places in The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1962). Some especially interesting and relevant passages occur in bk. 1, chap. 4, sec. 2; bk. 2, chaps. 2-4.
2. I refer here to Richard Brandt's Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), "Hedonism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 432-35, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), and "Two Concepts of Utility," originally published in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and reprinted in Brandt's Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-75.
3. I refer here to Richard Brandt's Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), "Hedonism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 432-35, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), and "Two Concepts of Utility," originally published in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and reprinted in Brandt's Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-75.
4. I refer here to Richard Brandt's Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), "Hedonism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 432-35, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), and "Two Concepts of Utility," originally published in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and reprinted in Brandt's Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-75.
5. I refer here to Richard Brandt's Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), "Hedonism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 432-35, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), and "Two Concepts of Utility," originally published in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and reprinted in Brandt's Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-75.
6. I refer here to Richard Brandt's Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), "Hedonism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 432-35, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), and "Two Concepts of Utility," originally published in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and reprinted in Brandt's Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 158-75.
7. William Alston, "Pleasure," in Edwards, ed., vol. 6, pp. 341-47.
8. William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), and "Value and Valuation," in Edwards, ed., vol. 8, pp. 229-32.
9. William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), and "Value and Valuation," in Edwards, ed., vol. 8, pp. 229-32.
10. This is a consistent theme in Brandt's work. He makes the point in many passages. See, e.g., Ethical Theory, pp. 303-7, A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 35-38, and "Hedonism," p. 433. endorsed the view in my "Two Questions about Pleasure," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 59-81. An interesting discussion of the view and some of its alleged implications can be found in Irwin Goldstein's "Hedonic Pluralism," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 49-55.
11. This is a consistent theme in Brandt's work. He makes the point in many passages. See, e.g., Ethical Theory, pp. 303-7, A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 35-38, and "Hedonism," p. 433. endorsed the view in my "Two Questions about Pleasure," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 59-81. An interesting discussion of the view and some of its alleged implications can be found in Irwin Goldstein's "Hedonic Pluralism," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 49-55.
12. This is a consistent theme in Brandt's work. He makes the point in many passages. See, e.g., Ethical Theory, pp. 303-7, A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 35-38, and "Hedonism," p. 433. endorsed the view in my "Two Questions about Pleasure," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 59-81. An interesting discussion of the view and some of its alleged implications can be found in Irwin Goldstein's "Hedonic Pluralism," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 49-55.
13. This is a consistent theme in Brandt's work. He makes the point in many passages. See, e.g., Ethical Theory, pp. 303-7, A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 35-38, and "Hedonism," p. 433. endorsed the view in my "Two Questions about Pleasure," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 59-81. An interesting discussion of the view and some of its alleged implications can be found in Irwin Goldstein's "Hedonic Pluralism," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 49-55.
14. This is a consistent theme in Brandt's work. He makes the point in many passages. See, e.g., Ethical Theory, pp. 303-7, A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 35-38, and "Hedonism," p. 433. endorsed the view in my "Two Questions about Pleasure," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. David Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 59-81. An interesting discussion of the view and some of its alleged implications can be found in Irwin Goldstein's "Hedonic Pluralism," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 49-55.
15. Sidgwick, p. 127.
16. Remarks similar to the one quoted from Sidgwick, p. 127, can be found on pp. 42, 131, and elsewhere.
17. For further discussion of hedonic pluralism, see J. L. Cowan, Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1968); Rem B. Edwards, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979); and J. C. B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969). For further references, see Goldstein, p. 54, n. 1.
18. For further discussion of hedonic pluralism, see J. L. Cowan, Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1968); Rem B. Edwards, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979); and J. C. B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969). For further references, see Goldstein, p. 54, n. 1.
19. For further discussion of hedonic pluralism, see J. L. Cowan, Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1968); Rem B. Edwards, Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979); and J. C. B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969). For further references, see Goldstein, p. 54, n. 1.
20. Brandt, Ethical Theory, pp. 306-7.
21. Brandt, "Hedonism," p. 433.
22. Brandt says essentially the same thing in "Two Concepts of Utility," pp. 164-65. A similar but slightly more complex view is defended in his A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 38-42. According to the latter view, an experience is pleasant "if and only if it makes its continuation more wanted" (p. 40). The added complexity is that there must be a causal connection between the experience and the increased desire for continuation.
23. Brandt says essentially the same thing in "Two Concepts of Utility," pp. 164-65. A similar but slightly more complex view is defended in his A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp. 38-42. According to the latter view, an experience is pleasant "if and only if it makes its continuation more wanted" (p. 40). The added complexity is that there must be a causal connection between the experience and the increased desire for continuation.
24. Alston, p. 345.
25. This is how I tried to explain "sensory pleasure" in my "Two Questions about Pleasure."
26. I return to this issue below in Sec. VII. See also my "Two Questions about Pleasure."
27. It should be clear that I am here glossing over differences among these definitions. For present purposes, the differences are unimportant. What's important is that on each of the cited views, there is some attitude, such that when we say that a feeling is a pleasure what we mean is that the person who has the feeling takes the attitude toward it.
28. See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 12-13. In the preface to the second edition of Principia Ethica, Moore says that he no longer thinks that pleasure is indefinable. I have not been able to find his alleged definition. A more recent advocate of the distinctive feeling view seems to be David Brink, who describes hedonism as the view that "the one and only intrinsic good is pleasure, which is understood as a simple, qualitative mental state" (Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 221).
29. See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 12-13. In the preface to the second edition of Principia Ethica, Moore says that he no longer thinks that pleasure is indefinable. I have not been able to find his alleged definition. A more recent advocate of the distinctive feeling view seems to be David Brink, who describes hedonism as the view that "the one and only intrinsic good is pleasure, which is understood as a simple, qualitative mental state" (Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 221).
30. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 305.
31. Alston, p. 344.
32. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 307.
33. For example, in "Hedonism," Brandt says that ethical hedonism "is the thesis that only pleasant states of mind are desirable in themselves" (p. 432).
34. Frankena, "Value and Valuation," p. 231. See also a similar passage in Frankena's Ethics, p. 84.
35. Frankena, "Value and Valuation," p. 231. See also a similar passage in Frankena's Ethics, p. 84.
36. I have in mind here especially the failure to take account of the role of basic intrinsic value states. For a discussion of basics, see Gilbert H. Harman, "Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 792-804.
37. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 307.
38. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 23, 27, and "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," in his Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 253-75, esp. p. 265.
39. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 23, 27, and "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," in his Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 253-75, esp. p. 265.
40. Moore struggled with the Principle of Universality in "The Conception of Intrinsic Value." There is good reason to be troubled by the principle. It is based upon a somewhat elusive conception of "intrinsic nature." We may say that a thing's intrinsic nature is the combination of all its intrinsic properties. However, if a thing's identity (e.g., in the case of Moore, the property of being identical to G. E. Moore) is one of its intrinsic properties, then no two things share an intrinsic nature. In this case, the principle has no application. If a thing's intrinsic value is an intrinsic property of that thing, then the principle is utterly trivial. An interesting version of the principle would say this: if two things are exactly alike with respect to nonevaluative purely general intrinsic properties, then they must be alike with respect to intrinsic value. Of course, to complete the task, one would have to explain the technical terminology.
41. In "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," Moore goes so far as to suggest that this is a definition of intrinsic value. "We can, in fact, set up the following definition. To say that a hind of value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of thing in question" (p. 260).
42. Brandt, Ethical Theory, pp. 302-3.
43. Frankena, Ethics, p. 82.
44. Roderick Chisholm endorses the principle in Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 95: "For attributions of intrinsic value are necessary. If pleasure is intrinsically good in this world, then it would be intrinsically good in any world in which it might be found." I think a suitably restricted version of the principle is true. I think it does not follow from the principle of universality, since I do not think that each thing has its intrinsic nature of necessity. (My current height is one of my intrinsic properties; I might have been taller.) However, if we take the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value to be states of affairs, and we assume that states of affairs do have their intrinsic natures of necessity, then we will think that the principle of necessity must be true.
45. Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 307.
46. Ibid.
47. When joyfully reminiscing, one may take pleasure in various states of affairs that occurred long ago and are now over. In such cases, one typically does not want to "prolong" the object of his pleasure. The "prolongation thesis" is more plausible when restricted to cases in which one takes intrinsic pleasure in some current feeling. It is somewhat more plausible to suppose that in such cases one always wants to prolong that feeling.
48. Another interesting sort of case was suggested by an editor of Ethics. This editor suggested that my view might go wrong because it is possible to be pleased to be experiencing a certain feeling even though the feeling itself is not pleasurable. But I believe that my theory is adequate to such cases. Suppose a certain chef is trying to make some food taste a certain way. Suppose that the chef himself does not find this taste (which we may call "T") pleasant, but he knows that others will enjoy it. When he finally gets the taste just right and samples the food, it may be true that he takes extrinsic pleasure in the fact he himself is then experiencing T. His pleasure is extrinsic because he takes this pleasure in the taste in virtue of the fact that it signifies that others will enjoy the food he has prepared. He does not take intrinsic pleasure in the fact that he is then experiencing T. That is, his experience of T is not a sensual pleasure for him.
49. In his doctoral dissertation "Pleasure and Intrinsic Value" (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1980), Earl Conee briefly discusses the central point of the present article. He says, "For many persons, tasting an ice-cream sundae is a pleasant experience. Yet hedonists do not attribute intrinsic value to events of tasting. They hold that the pleasure of the taste is the intrinsic good in the experience, not the taste that is its object" (p. 63). I think Conee here is too generous. Hedonists in the style of Sidgwick hold precisely the thing he says no hedonist holds. Of course, my aim in this article has been to show that the view is incoherent; they should not hold this view.