Analysing personal value

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 405-435

  Rønnow Rasmussen, Toni ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Buck passing analysis; Final value; For its own sake; G. E. Moore; Good for; Intrinsic value; Personal value; Respect; Stephen Darwall; Value for

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548554344     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10892-006-9012-1     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. A referee for The Journal of Ethics raised the question whether the distinction between personal and impersonal values is the only exemplification of the distinction between value period and value for. I suspect there are other examples. However, this is nothing that I will argue in this paper.
2. Not everyone agrees that there is an interesting sense of personal value. For instance, T. M. Scanlon does seem to be implying this when he states what it means to value one's children: "it is natural to say, and would be odd to deny, that I value my children; but it would be odd for me to put this by saying that they are valuable (except in the sense that everyone is);" see T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 95. I think Scanlon is wrong here. I think there is a third, way of understanding that the children are valuable, or have value for me, and this paper is an attempt to outline this view.
3. In the near future I hope to show just why we have reason to be suspicious about the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.
4. But see below where I discuss the likely possibility that a complex notion such as "good-for" is in fact ambiguous.
5. For a classic and quite devastating objection to Moore's attempt to show that the doctrine of egoism, is self-contradictory, see C. D. Broad's "Moore's Ethical Doctrines," in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1942).
6. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 150.
7. It might be that Moore did not have more in mind when he finished the passage quoted with the words "...and not the fact that it is good" than to say "goodness is not something that can belong to a person." Whether or not this is true, it does not change anything regarding what Moore accomplishes argumentatively.
8. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 150.
9. For an argument to the effect that it is things rather than the existence of these things that carry value, see Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A. Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100, (2000), pp. 33-49;
10. "Tropic of Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, (2003), pp. 389-403.
11. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 150-151. The notion of a "universal good" is left undefined. A natural interpretation (especially since he is discussing Henry Sidgwick's view on the matter) is that he has in mind "everyone's good."
12. Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969);
13. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930)
14. A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (London: Macmillan, 1947)
15. and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other.
16. See Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value," Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 391-424, in which we examine this kind of analysis in detail.
17. In A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 86, 90, he modifies his position. In this latter work, he interprets the "ought of fittingness" as an "ought of reasonableness."
18. Another version of the FA considers fittingness (worthiness, correctness) to be a primitive that cannot be subsumed under the standard, generic deontic notion, which includes notions such as "ought," "must" and "should." Fittingness constitutes on this view a special kind of deontic notion. Ewing, for instance, took this standpoint in his early work The Definition of Good.
19. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other.
20. See for instance, Elisabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)
21. Christine Swanton, "Profiles of the Virtues," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1995), pp. 335-344
22. Mareia W. Baron, "Kantian Ethics," in Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote (eds.), Three Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 3-91;
23. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value," pp. 389-403.
24. For monist approaches, see Noah M. Lemos, Intrinsic Value, Concept and Warrant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994);
25. Michael J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001);
26. "Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth," in Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 123-138;
27. and Jonas Olson, "Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), pp. 412-422.
28. For a collection of recent articles by monists as well, as pluralists, see Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman, Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, (Dordrecht: Springer 2005).
29. That something is valuable in its own right might lead one's thoughts to the idea that the object has value in virtue of some ability or capacity of the object that has been realized. In that case, this kind of value would also exclude, it seems, certain objects from the field of value bearers (Would, say, a state of affairs have value in its own right in this sense?). "Own right" also seems to suggest that the value that accrues to an object "in its own right" does so without the help of a subject. This suggests that the expression lends itself more easily to an objectivist analysis of value.
30. See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "The Strike of the Demon: On fitting Pro-attitudes and Value." One difficulty is the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, to wit, the problem consisting in distinguishing those reasons that bear on evaluation from those that do not. We may well have reasons to have, say, proattitudes that are satisfactory but nonetheless wrong from the point of view of FA. If a bully with low self-esteem tells me to appreciate him for his own sake under a threat of severe punishment, I have, it seems, a perfectly understandable reason to appreciate him. Given the threat, I ought to appreciate him. Notwithstanding, it does not seem right to conclude that the bully is valuable. The analytical problem of separating those reasons that are of the right kind from those that are not ought to put a damper on the enthusiasm of the FA advocates
31. [Cf. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, and their "conflation problem" in their "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the " Appropriateness" of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), pp. 65-90
32. see also their "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000), pp. 722-748;
33. "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti- Quasijudgmentalism)," in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
34. For an attempt to solve the problem, see Jonas Olson, "Buck-passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons," The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), pp. 295-300;
35. see also the reply by Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons," The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006), pp 114-120].
36. For some complications concerning the notion of instrumental value, see Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, "Instrumental Values - Strong and Weak," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, (2002), pp. 23-43.
37. Shelly Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," The Journal of Ethics 2 (1998), pp. 277-297
38. does not refer himself to these values as final values, but that is a mere terminological issue. The point is that he thinks something can be valuable for its own sake in virtue of some relational, property. For other examples, see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake," pp. 33-49.
39. Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value," pp. 277-297
40. and Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake," pp. 33-49.
41. It might be objected that DEFA need, only make an additional, and quite reasonable claim, namely, that we should regard the attitude of a as having value-constitutive powers. This would amount to a subjectivist version of DEFA. This might well be true. However, as long as the issue between subjectivism and objectivism, has not been settled in any convincing way, I will let the analysis reflect this by formulating a neutral analysans
42. [See Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Subjectivism and Objectivism: An Outline," in Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.), Pattern of Values: Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis (Lund: Lund Philosophy Reports, 2003), pp. 246-263, in which I suggest how the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism should be understood.
43. I discuss one such example in the next section.
44. Notice, if the analysis is in terms of pro-tanto reasons our analysis will be one of a pro-tanto value and not of an all-things-considered value. That we value a certain feature of an object does not imply that we necessarily ascribe value to the whole object itself. For instance, although I might value (in this respect) the ingenuity of a certain cunning crime, I would nonetheless not call it good. Again, we may value a certain colour, but its presence in a certain painting might well make the painting not valuable, and even awful. Just how we should balance the reasons called for by an object that is valuable in some respects, indifferent or even disvaluable in other respects, is a complicated issue. For a more detailed discussion, see Rabinowicz and Rennow-Rasmussen "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro Attitudes and Value," p. 418;
45. "Tropic of Value," pp. 398-399.
46. I am indebted to a referee for The Journal of Ethics for raising this issue.
47. Rabinowicz and Rennow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake," p. 48.
48. Our finally favouring attitude may take persons as objects in two important ways; the persistence of the favouring might be conditional on the (contingent) properties of the person, or it might not. In the latter case, we favour something for a's sake, regardless of or despite a's properties (as when we love someone period; see here my "Love, Value and Supervenience" in Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson and D. Egonsson (eds.), 2007, www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek.). I think the analysis is open to both kinds of attitudes, but it is not something that I will argue here.
49. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Buck-passing Personal Value," in David Chan (ed.), Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology (forthcoming), I explore the possibility of analysing final "favouring" of O in terms of an evaluative judgement to the effect that the object of the attitude is valuable for its own sake. This suggestion naturally prompts the reply that the analysis becomes circular. Certainly, this is true, but it is not a reason to reject the analysis
50. [David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 189].
51. Not all circles are malignant. This one here belongs to the benign kind; the analysis is informative for anyone who knows what an evaluative judgement is. The circle would pose a serious threat where there is no other means to determine the judgement "O is valuable for its own sake" than by resorting to an analysis of (final) value. However, this is not the case. There are different ways to determine what judgement a person endorses. The point is that we do have independent means to determine judgements without having to recur to analyses of the notions that these judgements contain. If this is true about final favouring, I see no reason why it would not also apply to "favouring an object for some person's sake." Here the judgement will be slightly different. Let "valuablex" refer to value-for x, i.e., what is of personal value for x. The judgement involved would then be something of the following sort: "O is valuablex for its own sake." For an illuminating work on different kinds of circles, see I. L. Humberstone, "Two Types of Circles," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 249-280. I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for making me aware of it.
52. The distinction between formal and substantive axiology is not clear-cut. For instance, how do we decide what is the "stuff" which should be analysed by the formal value theorist? Have we not, in fact, by singling out certain, say, judgements (as being evaluative ones) already taken an evaluative stand? But even if this might be true it does not follow that we cannot in an intelligible way still go on applying the notions "formal/substantive" within this special framework, To argue that the distinction lacks applicability is to make a much too encompassing claim - one that appears to me to be questionable. I venture that on most occasions it is not very hard to separate the formal parts from the substantive issues.
53. But might one not insist that favouring something for someone's sake always has to be understood in terms of what makes the person better off or what is in the person's interest? Perhaps. The question is, of course, whether "better off" or "interest" here is supposed to refer to an impersonal value or to a personal one? In either case, it would probably be to strain the word "better off" a bit too much to say that everything which we have a reason to favour for a person's sake will make him better off. See below the paragraph on the ambiguity of good-for.
54. It might be argued that we are not in fact at all respecting a for a's sake. We are rather respecting him for his dignity's sake; see for instance Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Now it is quite inoffensive to say that we respect a for his dignity's (or courage's) sake, as long as this is not taken to imply that the proper object of our attitude is dignity or courage. Surely, what we respect is persons and not properties. It would be odd to argue the latter. See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value," p. 399.
55. Here is another example. A person whom I once knew well lived a very self-destructive life. Some years ago we lost contact, and when I recently learned that the person had passed away very much due to living a tragic life, I immediately felt sadness. However, I also realized that my mourning this person's death had a different character than what I experienced when, for instance, my father died. In the latter case, I was sad for my own sake at having lost someone I cared a lot about. In the former case, I cannot sincerely say that I cared much for this person. My sadness was rather of the following kind: I was sad for her sake. Her disastrous life called forth a special feeling, sadness, which I experienced for her sake.
56. As was pointed out by the referees for The Journal of Ethics.
57. A third notion seems also intimately related to welfare and good-for, namely "better off." Thus, we might say that something is good-for a person if and only if it makes him better off and something makes a person better off if and only if it increases his welfare.
58. Of course, this is a substantial question (which it would be a pity to rule out on formal grounds), the answer to which requires some substantial reasoning - something there is no room for here.
59. I owe this example to Michael Brady.
60. As a referee for The Journal of Ethics rightly stressed.
61. See Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. xi, 135.
62. I am obliged to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics who pointed out the similarities between Darwall's analysis and my own. After having submitted this paper, I wrote a report on his book: "Recension av Stephen Darwalls Welfare and Rational Care," Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 4 (2004), pp. 171-180.
63. Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, pp. 6-7.
64. Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, p. 45. Darwall assumes that care or sympathetic concern, as he also refers to it, "is something like a psychological natural kind."
65. I have discussed these problems in Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Recension av Stephen Darwalls Welfare and Rational Care." For instance, one concerns the fact the analysis seems to give us something more than an analysis, namely, a criterion to single out what is in fact beneficial to individuals. See, for instance, where he states: "Something is for someone's good if it is what that person would want for herself, as she actually is, insofar as she is fully knowledgeable and experienced and unreservedly concerned for herself," (Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, p. 31). This is presented, given that "any informed-desire standard can serve" as a "plausible criterion of welfare." Moreover, this "criterion" does resemble his analysis of welfare quoted above. Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine the distinction between analysing x and suggesting a criterion for what counts as x. But in Darwall's case, by adding the "care- proviso" he does appear to be trying to ensure that the analysis will not lead us to call things good-for that do not make the person better. If this is the case, it should be avoided. A formal analysis ought not to contain parts that aim at securing "correct" substantive judgements.
66. Accounting for the normativity in terms of what I have referred to as his "careproviso" raises an interesting issue: should we regard welfare as normative when we need, to formulate the analysis of it in terms of a condition? Or should we say that it has merely conditional normativity? This might be a mere terminological quibble, but I suspect it is not. Consider the distinction between "a belief on a condition" (e.g., that there is tiger in my living room, given that I see it with my own eyes), and a "conditional belief" (e.g., that if there is a tiger in my living room, then I will believe I am in danger) (I thank Rabinowicz for reminding me of this analogy); whereas the former is not one that I have unless the condition is met, the latter is a belief - it is just not a categorical one. Now, it might be replied that this suggests that we should rather formulate the analysans in analogy with a conditional belief. Thus, in, say, the Eva Braun example we would get something like the following lines: If you care for Hitler, then you ought to favour Eva Braun (for Hitler's sake). However, as mentioned before, if we introduce the "attitude (care)-clause" in order to secure the normativity of the consequent, I would rule this out for the reasons mentioned in the main text. I side with those who think that reasons must be attitude-given. If this is not what is behind the "conditional form," then I suspect the disagreement between an FAP advocate and someone offering this kind of analysis may well boil down to a substantive disagreement about what reasons there are. I do not want to exclude that there are such "conditional, values." But consenting to this is consistent with there being values in a stronger sense requiring a categorical analysans, which is what I try to deliver.
67. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 18, 167f.
68. Consider again the "pro-tanto" solution. It was argued that Braun being good for Hitler supplies us with a pro-tanto reason to have some pro-response regarding Braun for Hitler's sake, but that it does not follow from this that Hitler is pro-toto worthy of our pro-responses. The referee's suggestion might in fact strengthen this claim, given the following premise; in the case a moral reason is a pro-tanto reason and it is in conflict with another non-moral pro-tanto reason, the latter is overridden by the former.
69. The examples are inspired by objections made to me by Jonas Olson and Michael Brady.
70. An alternative approach to this issue would be to ask the persisting person the following question: Would you not at least accept that if you want to do everything that can be done for x's sake, you ought to favour O? I owe this informal suggestion to Margaret Gilbert. Cf. also Darwall's Welfare and Rational Care. An anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Ethics also expressed a similar point. These suggestions are worth considering. However, whereas these proposals regard (personal) value as normatively conditional on a person's attitudes (wants and cares for...), my suggestion sets out from the idea that what we have reasons to do is not necessarily a matter of what attitudes we have.
71. This work has developed as a result of a series of conversations over the years with Wlodek Rabinowicz, to whom I am deeply indebted. Comments by David Aim, Dan Egonsson, and Michael Zimmerman have also helped me a great deal. An earlier version was presented at a workshop at SCASSS (Uppsala), and I wish to thank the workshop members for useful comments, in particular David Bengtsson, John Broome, Johan Bränmark, Krister Bykvist, Erik Carlsson, Sven Danielsson, Margaret Gilbert, Jonas Olson, Howard Sobel, and Daniel Svensson. Thanks also to the audience members who attended my talk at Stevens Point, University of Wisconsin, in particular Michael Stocker, and later at ECAP (Lissabon), in particular Graham Oddie, Gianfranco Pellegrino, and John Skorupski. Kind invitations from the University of Stirling and the University of Aberdeen were followed, by stimulating discussions, for which I am especially grateful to Peter Baumann, Michael Brady, Rowan Cruft, Adrian Haddock, and Alan Miller. Finally, I am indebted to three anonymous referees for The Journal of Ethics for useful comments. The work on this paper was supported by a research grant from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.