Sentiment and value

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 722-748

  D'Arms, Justin ^a   Jacobson, Daniel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039592585     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233371     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Niddich, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 470.
2. David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Niddich, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 172-73.
3. Ibid., p. 173.
4. This thought is, in itself, no concession to skepticism about value. Even such avowedly nonskeptical moral philosophers as Korsgaard, Nagel, and Railton hold something to this effect, though their views vary considerably in detail. See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95 (1987): 163-207.
5. This thought is, in itself, no concession to skepticism about value. Even such avowedly nonskeptical moral philosophers as Korsgaard, Nagel, and Railton hold something to this effect, though their views vary considerably in detail. See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95 (1987): 163-207.
6. This thought is, in itself, no concession to skepticism about value. Even such avowedly nonskeptical moral philosophers as Korsgaard, Nagel, and Railton hold something to this effect, though their views vary considerably in detail. See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95 (1987): 163-207.
7. Our principal term here is 'sentiment', which we will use broadly to refer to any occurrent, object-directed, affect-laden mental state. Moods are affective states - that is, states that feel a certain way - which are not sentiments, since they lack objects. Emotions are paradigm cases of sentiments, but we want to restrict the term 'emotion' to a central class of such mental states found across cultures and epochs: Hume's "common sentiments of mankind."
8. Indeed, even our formulation is contentious, since internalism can be offered as a thesis about evaluative properties rather than judgments. See Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Many philosophers would deny internalism about morality, as Hume did, and hold that it's possible for a "sensible knave" to know right from wrong yet not to care about doing right. But it is much less plausible to deny all internalist constraints on the concept of self-interest or on an agent's reasons for acting. See Railton, "Moral Realism," for a view that is externalist about morality but internalist, in a subtle and powerful way, about self-interest.
9. Indeed, even our formulation is contentious, since internalism can be offered as a thesis about evaluative properties rather than judgments. See Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Many philosophers would deny internalism about morality, as Hume did, and hold that it's possible for a "sensible knave" to know right from wrong yet not to care about doing right. But it is much less plausible to deny all internalist constraints on the concept of self-interest or on an agent's reasons for acting. See Railton, "Moral Realism," for a view that is externalist about morality but internalist, in a subtle and powerful way, about self-interest.
10. Behavior must be understood broadly, so as to include more than deliberate action. Thus, simply the impulse to flee, or a "cold sweat," can be taken as evidence of the constellation of motives involved in fear.
11. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
12. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
13. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
14. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
15. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
16. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
17. See Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Ward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," and "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds.; and David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in ibid. Another contemporary philosopher in this tradition is Elizabeth Anderson, whose rational attitude theory is also a form of sophisticated sentimentalism. Since Anderson's theory is driven by normative, more than metaethical, considerations, we will not take it up here, but a similar argument can be made against her view. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
18. Alternatively, the theory can identify the judgment that an object Y is good (or bad) with desire for (or aversion to) Y. The same criticisms tell against this proposal, mutatis mutandis.
19. The theory given in A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Press, 1936), is the closest thing to pure emotivism. Stevenson adds an outward-looking prescription to others to feel similarly, which is needed to get anything like dispute. See Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46 (1937): 14-31. Consider that the "yea" and "boo" of fans of rival sports teams are precisely not intended to influence or persuade dissenters, nor must I think you are getting something wrong in your disappointment over my team's ultimate triumph. (What could that be - the sheer goodness of my side prevailing? It seems far more plausible to think that you are right: your team's pitiful effort really is the way your disappointment presents it to you as being, namely, bad for your side.) This is disagreement in attitude without real dispute.
20. The theory given in A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Press, 1936), is the closest thing to pure emotivism. Stevenson adds an outward-looking prescription to others to feel similarly, which is needed to get anything like dispute. See Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46 (1937): 14-31. Consider that the "yea" and "boo" of fans of rival sports teams are precisely not intended to influence or persuade dissenters, nor must I think you are getting something wrong in your disappointment over my team's ultimate triumph. (What could that be - the sheer goodness of my side prevailing? It seems far more plausible to think that you are right: your team's pitiful effort really is the way your disappointment presents it to you as being, namely, bad for your side.) This is disagreement in attitude without real dispute.
21. Both common sense and the best theories of the emotions are agreed that such disparity between a bout of emotion and one's considered judgment is quite possible. See Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988); and Gibbard, Wise Choices.
22. Both common sense and the best theories of the emotions are agreed that such disparity between a bout of emotion and one's considered judgment is quite possible. See Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988); and Gibbard, Wise Choices.
23. There are disputes even about the dispositional account of color, but most sides accept the truth of the biconditional; the dispute is over whether a more substantive analysis of color terms is needed or can be given. See Paul Boghossian and David Velleman, "Colour as a Secondary Quality," Mind 98 (1989): 81-103.
24. See Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, "Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics," in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., pp. 3-47.
25. Peter Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity," Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1989): 151-74, p. 158.
26. It may be that there are two distinct senses of 'disgusting', one normative (in the way we're suggesting) and the other dispositional. The latter is most frequently used relationally, as in: "Yak cheese is disgusting to most Westerners, but it's a staple of the Tibetan diet." Take our remarks above, then, as being concerned with the first, and most distinctively evaluative, sense.
27. Of course, the reactions and opinions of others are likely to influence our own, and it seems to us only reasonable to remain generally open to such influence. But this is a far cry from embracing dispositionalism.
28. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987).
29. This is a simplified account of Hume's view. His theory of taste is sufficiently sophisticated to take account of the corrupting effects of prejudice and to allow for certain "blameless" disagreements that cannot be reconciled, among other complications. We hope that our debt to Hume, as a founder of sentimentalism, is evident, despite our conviction that his account cannot succeed as it stands. For two disparate but fruitful ways of developing Hume's theory, see David Wiggins; and Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jarrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
30. Our thanks to David Hills for pointing out the relevance of the fable and the challenge it provides for Hume's account of delicacy.
31. This point is most clearly made in Blackburn, Ruling Passions, esp. chap. 8.
32. Although "response dependence" is sometimes associated with forms of dispositionalism, we will use the term in the overtly normative sense suggested by the neosentimentalist program.
33. McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," p. 208. See also Wiggins, p. 197.
34. McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," p. 208. See also Wiggins, p. 197.
35. The noncognitivists' appropriation of ordinary normative locutions makes even stating the difference between these views difficult. Perhaps the best way is to distinguish between "factualists" and "nonfactualists," but it will then be contentious whether even the cognitivist sentimentalists count as factualists. See Peter Railton, "Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 961-68.
36. McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," p. 207.
37. A sentimentalist must be able to insist, however, that it isn't merely our thinking wanton cruelty to be wrong which makes it so. It would be cruel even if we didn't realize it. The worry that sentimentalists are not entitled to say such things about the independence of evaluative properties can be pressed against the cognitivists and noncognitivists alike. Both defend themselves against such worries through some fancy philosophical footwork, of which an unregenerate realist (or antirealist) would be suspicious.
38. For an argument against comic moralism, see Daniel Jacobson, "In Praise of Immoral Art," Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 155-99.
39. For an argument that such moral considerations about whether to feel an emotion F at some object X are systematically irrelevant to whether X is F, see Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotion," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90.
40. While it would admittedly be odd to say that "envy isn't appropriate" on grounds of expedience (as opposed to propriety), it wou d be quite natural to conclude that "envy isn't rational," and 'rational' is Gibbard's prefer-ed normative term in RDT. Similar problems will arise for all the normative terms used by the sentimentalists under consideration here.
41. In fact, McDowell and Wiggins grant the possibility of scientific, even evolutionary stories of the type Blackburn and Gibbard suggest. And the cognitivists' insistence that there is no "purely phenomenological" account of the sentiments is a bit of a red herring, since neither Blackburn nor Gibbard hold that the sentiments are mere feelings. They can both make use of the objects and causes of our responses in individuating them.
42. Wiggins, p. 189.
43. Williams offers a particularly clear and interesting argument that this dispute should be framed in terms of knowledge rather than truth. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
44. See, e.g., Railton, "Aesthetic Value."
45. McDowell, "Projection and Truth in Ethics," p. 218.
46. Ibid., p. 220.
47. Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, p. 79.
48. McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," p. 207; his emphasis.
49. Indeed, Gaut and Anderson seem to use the term this way, as is evident from their acceptance of comic moralism. But every locution, including our own talk of the "fittingness" of emotion, has this semantic wobble to some degree, for the same (explicable) reasons. See Berys Gaut, "The Ethical Criticism of Art," in Levinson, ed.; also see Anderson.
50. McDowell, "Projection and Truth in Ethics," p. 221.
51. Ibid., p. 224n; his emphasis.
52. However, this approach seems uncongenial to someone who takes talk of the virtues as seriously as does McDowell. If you hold the doctrine of the unity of the virtues, and that virtue always issues in right action, then it looks like you're stuck saying that how the virtuous person would respond - presumably with disdain at morally obnoxious jokes, however viciously funny - is the appropriate way to feel. But then one must give up RDT.
53. Unless one holds shame to present its object - roughly, some flaw or weakness in the affected agent - as something one is responsible for. While some philosophers are tempted to moralize such emotions as amusement, shame, and envy, we think this is a systematic error with a common cause: the natural reluctance to endorse, in anyway, an emotion one deems it wrong to feel. On shame, see Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949); and on envy, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). On the notion of reciprocal emotions, see Gibbard, Wise Choices.
54. Unless one holds shame to present its object - roughly, some flaw or weakness in the affected agent - as something one is responsible for. While some philosophers are tempted to moralize such emotions as amusement, shame, and envy, we think this is a systematic error with a common cause: the natural reluctance to endorse, in anyway, an emotion one deems it wrong to feel. On shame, see Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949); and on envy, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). On the notion of reciprocal emotions, see Gibbard, Wise Choices.
55. Unless one holds shame to present its object - roughly, some flaw or weakness in the affected agent - as something one is responsible for. While some philosophers are tempted to moralize such emotions as amusement, shame, and envy, we think this is a systematic error with a common cause: the natural reluctance to endorse, in anyway, an emotion one deems it wrong to feel. On shame, see Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949); and on envy, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). On the notion of reciprocal emotions, see Gibbard, Wise Choices.
56. Wiggins, p. 198.
57. Ibid., p. 195n.
58. The basic emotions, which have cross-cultural equivalents and about which evolutionary stories can most plausibly be told, are least amenable to this approach, whereas, if there are distinct responses associated with more culturally specific "thick" evaluative concepts (such as chivalrous and lewd), they might well be more deeply "made for" these properties. See Williams for a discussion of thick concepts; also see Allan Gibbard, "Morality and Thick Concepts: I, Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings," and Simon Blackburn, "Morality and Thick Concepts: II, Through Thick and Thin," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66, suppl. (1992): 267-83, 285-99. We think there is more to say about these cases, but that must be the task of another day.
59. The basic emotions, which have cross-cultural equivalents and about which evolutionary stories can most plausibly be told, are least amenable to this approach, whereas, if there are distinct responses associated with more culturally specific "thick" evaluative concepts (such as chivalrous and lewd), they might well be more deeply "made for" these properties. See Williams for a discussion of thick concepts; also see Allan Gibbard, "Morality and Thick Concepts: I, Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings," and Simon Blackburn, "Morality and Thick Concepts: II, Through Thick and Thin," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66, suppl. (1992): 267-83, 285-99. We think there is more to say about these cases, but that must be the task of another day.
60. The basic emotions, which have cross-cultural equivalents and about which evolutionary stories can most plausibly be told, are least amenable to this approach, whereas, if there are distinct responses associated with more culturally specific "thick" evaluative concepts (such as chivalrous and lewd), they might well be more deeply "made for" these properties. See Williams for a discussion of thick concepts; also see Allan Gibbard, "Morality and Thick Concepts: I, Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings," and Simon Blackburn, "Morality and Thick Concepts: II, Through Thick and Thin," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66, suppl. (1992): 267-83, 285-99. We think there is more to say about these cases, but that must be the task of another day.
61. See David Wiggins, "Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1991): 61-85.
62. See Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" esp. pp. 198, 212.
63. Gibbard, Wise Choices, pp. 6 ff.
64. Gibbard uses 'rational' and 'makes sense' synonymously. As he notes, there is something unfortunate about each locution (or any other available in ordinary language). 'Makes sense' can be read empirically, as what we would expect or can explain. Gibbard is not concerned with this empirical "makes sense that," but with the normative "makes sense to." For simplicity's sake, we will stick to 'rational' here, but the quotations from Gibbard use both locutions interchangeably.
65. Two of Gibbard's three arguments concern weakness of will. The first is given here, and the second takes up the Milgram experiment. The conclusion Gibbard correctly draws from the famous experiment is that most of the participants are more strongly in the grip of norms (about obedience) other than those they most strongly endorse (about not harming the innocent). Hence, they do what does not seem best to them, i.e., they continue to administer electric shocks to subjects under orders from the experimenter. Or so they think.
66. Gibbard, Wise Choices, p. 56.
67. Ibid., pp. 9-22; and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, "Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics."
68. Ibid., pp. 9-22; and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, "Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics."
69. Perhaps not all intrinsic desires, but we won't worry about the many complications to this issue that don't bear on the matter at hand.
70. Gibbard cites James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Darwall; Korsgaard.
71. Gibbard cites James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Darwall; Korsgaard.
72. Strictly speaking, this is an account of the blameworthiness of an action, because unless the agent is responsible for his wrongdoing, guilt and anger at him are not rational. But, following Gibbard, we will ignore this complication here by assuming that the agent's responsibility is not at issue.
73. Gibbard, Wise Choices, p. 51.
74. Dennis need not think this true of all the traits he deems shameful; such strategic considerations are most powerful specifically when it would be debilitating actually to be ashamed. By contrast, the clichéd "98-pound weakling" who gets sand kicked in his face until he goes in for the weightlifting regimen is constructively motivated by his shame. Note, too, that to abjure endorsing shame at an admittedly shameful trait, on strategic or moral grounds, does not commit one to holding I hat others would be in any sense irrational to disdain you for this trait, even if (as Gibbard suggests, and we accept) one's norms for the warrant of first-person shame and third-person disdain must mesh. We are grateful to an anonymous editor for encouraging us to clarify these points.
75. Gibbard, Wise Choices, p. 36.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 49; emphasis added.
78. Ibid., p. 37.
79. To deny this is, in effect, to insist that evidential reasons always settle what to feel. This is a substantive normative position which norm expressivism is not intended to involve. It also happens to be a crazy normative position. The thought that a feeling is warranted may always count in favor of feeling it, but moral and prudential reasons not to feel it can count too and are sometimes more important.
80. Whether he endorses desiring to feel shame is a further question, presumably to be settled by consideration of the reasons for and against having this desire. Except in certain extraordinary circumstances, he would not endorse this desire either.
81. This may be the best interpretation of Gibbard's account of judgments of rationality. It should be noted, though, that this view would require rethinking the arguments that Gibbard uses to motivate norm expressivism in the first place. See appendix.
82. See Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions," Ethics 104 (1994): 739-63.
83. This terminology follows Richard Brandt, "Moral Valuation," Ethics 56 (1946): 106 -21, an important and insightful paper which nevertheless fails to deal with the conflation problem. The notion of emotional fittingness is considered in more depth in D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy"; we hope to develop a theory of rational sentimentalism further in our subsequent work.
84. This terminology follows Richard Brandt, "Moral Valuation," Ethics 56 (1946): 106 -21, an important and insightful paper which nevertheless fails to deal with the conflation problem. The notion of emotional fittingness is considered in more depth in D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy"; we hope to develop a theory of rational sentimentalism further in our subsequent work.
85. See P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 80.
86. This is perhaps most obvious with respect to doubts about whether there is any such sentiment as moral disapprobation, and doubts about whether contingent, human responses could have the special sort of authority that morality has been thought to invoke. But we think that worries about the circularity of response-dependent accounts, which some sentimentalists deny (as does Gibbard) and others admit but claim not to be vicious (like Wiggins), also have more bite when applied to accounts of good and right than to funny and shameful.