Democratic reason: The mechanisms of collective intelligence in politics

Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 251-289

  Landemore, Hélène ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923400740     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511846427.012     Document Type: Chapter

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