Corporate boards, incentive pay and shareholder activism in Europe: Main issues and policy perspectives

Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-66

  Belcredi, Massimo ^a   Ferrarini, Guido ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^c Genoa Centre for Law and Finance   (Italy)

^d European Corporate Governance Institute   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923388154     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139629126.001     Document Type: Chapter

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