Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis

Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-320

  Bainbridge, Stephen M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital market competitiveness; Corporate governance; Credit crunch; Dodd Frank Act; Dotcom bubble; Economic crisis; Federal government; Housing bubble; Sarbanes Oxley Act; US

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880082391     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199772421.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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