Executive remuneration in the EU: The context for reform

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 304-323

  Ferrarini, Guido ^a   Moloney, Niamh ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EUROPEAN UNION; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 23844553095     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/gri018     Document Type: Article

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