"Two-Thousand Years of Stasis": How Psychological Essentialism Impedes Evolutionary Understa

Evolution Challenges: Integrating Research and Practice in Teaching and Learning about Evolution

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Gelman, Susan A ^a   Rhodes, Marjorie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accepting evolution; Categories concepts; Essentialism; Science education; Understanding evolution

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922761054     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730421.003.0001     Document Type: Chapter

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