Representation of principled connections: A window onto the formal aspect of common sense conception

Cognitive Science

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 401-448

  Prasada, Sandeep ^a   Dillingham, Elaine M ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Conceptual representation; Formal aspect of concepts; Generic Knowledge; Modes of explanation; Principled connections; Type token representations

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349766159     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01018.x     Document Type: Article

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