Explanation, internalism, and reasons for action

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 218-235

  Sobel, David ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039698126     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s026505250000296x     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35.
2. Ibid., 38.
3. Ibid., 39.
4. Ibid., 38-39.
5. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 107.
6. John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds., World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
7. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," 36-37.
8. Ibid., 37.
9. Connie Rosati, "Internalism and the Good for a Person," Ethics 106, no. 2 (1996): 307.
10. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
11. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
12. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
13. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
14. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
15. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
16. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
17. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
18. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
19. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
20. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
21. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
22. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
23. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 10, 113, 329; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 101-5, 214-16; R. M. Hare, "Replies," in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on "Moral Thinking" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18; James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 407-24; David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. 2; Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 2 (1986): 5-31; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism, and some would decline the label. Robert Shaver raises some of these caveats in the case of Sidgwick. See Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics 107, no. 2 (1997): 314-20; see also David Sobel, "Reply to Shaver," published in 1997 in the e-journal BEARS, available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/9707sobel. html [posted on July 7, 1997].
24. In David Sobel, "Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration," Economics and Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1998): 249-83, I consider ways that such a theory could try to respond to the fact that some of our concerns are moral or quasi-moral and hence not perfectly correlated with our well-being. I conclude that any such method will reveal that well-being is not the appropriate object of moral concern. I defend instead the autonomy principle, which would allow agents to throw the weight they are granted in moral reflection where they informedly see fit. For a different take on similar issues, see Stephen Darwall's "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14, no. 1 (1997): 158-78.
25. In David Sobel, "Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration," Economics and Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1998): 249-83, I consider ways that such a theory could try to respond to the fact that some of our concerns are moral or quasi-moral and hence not perfectly correlated with our well-being. I conclude that any such method will reveal that well-being is not the appropriate object of moral concern. I defend instead the autonomy principle, which would allow agents to throw the weight they are granted in moral reflection where they informedly see fit. For a different take on similar issues, see Stephen Darwall's "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14, no. 1 (1997): 158-78.
26. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 111-12.
27. I take this example from Griffin, Well-Being, 11.
28. I have presented these reasons for moving from a Sidgwickian view (and to a Railtonian view - see below) in David Sobel, "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104, no. 4 (1994): 784-810.
29. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," 16. But see ibid., 25 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96, no. 2 (1986): 175-76 n. 17, for the claim that this account merely "tracks" one's good, that is, while the account shows what an agent's good is, it is not the case that an agent's good is her good because it fulfills the account's criterion. (I discuss this distinction in more detail later in this section.) Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (Railton, "Facts and Values," 9), is compatible with the claim that the full information account merely tracks one's good. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
30. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," 16. But see ibid., 25 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96, no. 2 (1986): 175-76 n. 17, for the claim that this account merely "tracks" one's good, that is, while the account shows what an agent's good is, it is not the case that an agent's good is her good because it fulfills the account's criterion. (I discuss this distinction in more detail later in this section.) Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (Railton, "Facts and Values," 9), is compatible with the claim that the full information account merely tracks one's good. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
31. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," 16. But see ibid., 25 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96, no. 2 (1986): 175-76 n. 17, for the claim that this account merely "tracks" one's good, that is, while the account shows what an agent's good is, it is not the case that an agent's good is her good because it fulfills the account's criterion. (I discuss this distinction in more detail later in this section.) Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (Railton, "Facts and Values," 9), is compatible with the claim that the full information account merely tracks one's good. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
32. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," 16. But see ibid., 25 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96, no. 2 (1986): 175-76 n. 17, for the claim that this account merely "tracks" one's good, that is, while the account shows what an agent's good is, it is not the case that an agent's good is her good because it fulfills the account's criterion. (I discuss this distinction in more detail later in this section.) Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (Railton, "Facts and Values," 9), is compatible with the claim that the full information account merely tracks one's good. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
33. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," 16. But see ibid., 25 and Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96, no. 2 (1986): 175-76 n. 17, for the claim that this account merely "tracks" one's good, that is, while the account shows what an agent's good is, it is not the case that an agent's good is her good because it fulfills the account's criterion. (I discuss this distinction in more detail later in this section.) Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (Railton, "Facts and Values," 9), is compatible with the claim that the full information account merely tracks one's good. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See Peter Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
34. Railton, "Facts and Values," 14. Consider, however, that our idealized self could want our ordinary self to want X because the idealized agent knows that our ordinary self's doing so will be instrumentally effective in bringing about, albeit unintentionally, Y, something that the idealized agent finds to be best for our ordinary self. If we say that what is good for our ordinary self is what our idealized self wants our ordinary self to want, we seem to misdescribe these cases of indirection. Perhaps it would be better to focus on the kind of life that the idealized agent wants the ordinary self to have.
35. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 151.
36. This highlights a rather general problem for conditional theories. See Robert K. Shope, "The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy 75, no. 8 (1978): 397-413; and Robert K. Shope, "Rawls, Brandt, and the Definition of Rational Desires," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (1978): 329-40. I am grateful to Steve Darwall for these references.
37. This highlights a rather general problem for conditional theories. See Robert K. Shope, "The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy 75, no. 8 (1978): 397-413; and Robert K. Shope, "Rawls, Brandt, and the Definition of Rational Desires," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (1978): 329-40. I am grateful to Steve Darwall for these references.
38. I take the useful term "ideal advisor account" from Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105, no. 2 (1995): 296-325. Rosati goes on in that paper to critique such accounts. I critique such accounts in "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being." Although both of these papers are critical of such accounts, both agree that the move from the simpler accounts (we might call them direct motivational accounts) to ideal advisor accounts is a step in the right direction. Although both papers' critiques are offered against full information accounts of well-being, they are equally effective against full information accounts of reasons for action.
39. I make this case much more fully in David Sobel, "Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics 111, no. 3 (2001): 461-92. also argue in that essay that attention to the distinction between an account of reasons and an account of rationality undermines Christine Korsgaard's case against the instrumentalism of Hume and Williams that she offers in Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reason," in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Garret Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
40. I make this case much more fully in David Sobel, "Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics 111, no. 3 (2001): 461-92. also argue in that essay that attention to the distinction between an account of reasons and an account of rationality undermines Christine Korsgaard's case against the instrumentalism of Hume and Williams that she offers in Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reason," in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Garret Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
41. I make this case much more fully in David Sobel, "Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics 111, no. 3 (2001): 461-92. also argue in that essay that attention to the distinction between an account of reasons and an account of rationality undermines Christine Korsgaard's case against the instrumentalism of Hume and Williams that she offers in Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reason," in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Garret Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
42. Stephen Darwall's formulations of existence internalism (Darwall, Impartial Reason, 55) and metaphysical internalism (Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], 308-9) are both, like Williams's formulation of internalism, put in terms of necessary conditions for being a reason Thus these versions of internalism that Darwall describes are also subject to the importantly different interpretations mentioned in the text. Darwall briefly notes this ambiguity in the latter discussion.
43. Stephen Darwall's formulations of existence internalism (Darwall, Impartial Reason, 55) and metaphysical internalism (Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], 308-9) are both, like Williams's formulation of internalism, put in terms of necessary conditions for being a reason Thus these versions of internalism that Darwall describes are also subject to the importantly different interpretations mentioned in the text. Darwall briefly notes this ambiguity in the latter discussion.
44. Michael Smith's account of reasons for action in The Moral Problem is best understood as a version of tracking internalism. He thinks that the desires of all ideally rational agents converging on certain things is necessary and sufficient for our having reasons, and in particular reasons to do what our desires converge on. According to Smith, the best eaxplanation for such a convergence, if it occurred, would be that there are "extremely unobvious a priori moral truths" (Smith, The Moral Problem, 187). On his view, it is these truths that make it the case that we have reasons to do certain things; our ideally informed deliberations simply get our motivations to track these truths. I critique Smith's arguments for convergence in David Sobel, "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59, no. 3 (1999): 137-47.
45. Michael Smith's account of reasons for action in The Moral Problem is best understood as a version of tracking internalism. He thinks that the desires of all ideally rational agents converging on certain things is necessary and sufficient for our having reasons, and in particular reasons to do what our desires converge on. According to Smith, the best eaxplanation for such a convergence, if it occurred, would be that there are "extremely unobvious a priori moral truths" (Smith, The Moral Problem, 187). On his view, it is these truths that make it the case that we have reasons to do certain things; our ideally informed deliberations simply get our motivations to track these truths. I critique Smith's arguments for convergence in David Sobel, "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59, no. 3 (1999): 137-47.
46. Michael Smith's account of reasons for action in The Moral Problem is best understood as a version of tracking internalism. He thinks that the desires of all ideally rational agents converging on certain things is necessary and sufficient for our having reasons, and in particular reasons to do what our desires converge on. According to Smith, the best eaxplanation for such a convergence, if it occurred, would be that there are "extremely unobvious a priori moral truths" (Smith, The Moral Problem, 187). On his view, it is these truths that make it the case that we have reasons to do certain things; our ideally informed deliberations simply get our motivations to track these truths. I critique Smith's arguments for convergence in David Sobel, "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59, no. 3 (1999): 137-47.
47. Korsgaard, "Skepticism About Practical Reason," 11.
48. See Sobel, "Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action."
49. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," 101. This is Williams's casual and "very rough" characterization of internalism in the earlier paper. The formulation of internalism offered in the later "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," which I cite at the beginning of Section II of this essay, is clearly intended to be his official "nonrough" characterization of internalism. This formulation is also the sort Williams invokes in Bernard Williams, "Replies," in Altham and Harrison, eds., World, Mind, and Ethics, 186-94. Furthermore, the later characterization is the one that has been picked up by subsequent writers on internalism such as Darwall and Korsgaard.
50. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," 101. This is Williams's casual and "very rough" characterization of internalism in the earlier paper. The formulation of internalism offered in the later "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," which I cite at the beginning of Section II of this essay, is clearly intended to be his official "nonrough" characterization of internalism. This formulation is also the sort Williams invokes in Bernard Williams, "Replies," in Altham and Harrison, eds., World, Mind, and Ethics, 186-94. Furthermore, the later characterization is the one that has been picked up by subsequent writers on internalism such as Darwall and Korsgaard.
51. Throughout this essay I have been treating the concepts of 'motivation' and 'desire' as unproblematic so as to focus on other issues. In fact, I find these concepts not yet satisfactorily analyzed. For some initial misgivings, see David Sobel and David Copp, "Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire," Analysis 61, no. 1 (2001): 44-53.
52. Unfortunately, I did not read Robert Johnson's excellent "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 194 (1999): 53-71, until it was too late to take it into account here. Johnson offers compelling arguments for some of the central conclusions that I urge in the second half of this essay.