Practical reason and the possibility of error

Ethics

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 424-457

  Lavin, Douglas ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4544223660     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/381695     Document Type: Review

References (100)

1. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
2. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
3. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
4. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
5. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
6. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
7. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
8. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
9. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
10. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
11. Jonathan Bennett, Rationality: An Essay toward Analysis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 17; Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 14; Bernard Williams, "Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons," in Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 91-97, pp. 92-93; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 105; Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Of course, many others have explicitly endorsed the connection: Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 155-74; James Dreier, "Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-99; Donald Hubin, "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445-68; Peter Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 53-79; John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), chap. 3; R. Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001003.
12. There is a tradition of thought about practical reason according to which it is simply a capacity for the mechanical application of general and statable rules in particular circumstances. And by adopting the expression "principle" to pick out norms of action, and the phrase "being under a principle" to pick out being assessable in the light of a norm of action, I may give the impression that I mean to endorse this model. But that would be a mistaken impression: in speaking of "principles" and "being under principles" I merely assume, with the authors quoted at the very beginning of this section, that agents and actions are assessable in the light of norms. Whether norms have the form of mechanically applicable rules is not settled by this assumption. There is also a tradition of thought about practical reason according to which principles of reason are formal principles in my sense. I have adopted the expression "formal principle" in order to remain neutral on that question as well.
13. The argument is developed at length in Christine Korsgaard's "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason" (in Cullity and Gaut, eds., pp. 215-54). Of course, neutralizing Korsgaard's argument does not prove that instrumentalism is coherent-there may be other ways of administering the poison. Even so, it is worth asking why the more general project of vindicating the coherence of instrumentalism is of any interest. The most straightforward answer would be that it is a step toward establishing its truth. Seems a small step in that direction, though: consider how anemic a defense of the truth of, say, the phlogiston theory of combustion would be on the grounds of its coherence. Leaving aside the question of instrumentalism's truth, for the moment, we can still see that its mere coherence would create trouble for anyone hoping to anchor more-than-instrumental principles in an abstract analysis of rational agency, a strategy typically associated with the Kantian tradition in practical philosophy. Here's the trouble. If instrumentalism is coherent, then it is possible that there is some sort of creature whose practical reason operates in such a way as to be completely characterized with the resources of instrumentalism. Maybe this is how it is with the Martians? The Martian would then be a rational agent, of a sort, and yet would be entirely limited to employing reason in the service of achieving further aims. On its face, this mere possibility places a wedge between possession of practical reason and being subject to more-than-instrumental standards and disrupts the attempt to derive the latter from the former. What, then, of the truth of instrumentalism? This is a much longer story and one entirely independent of this essay. Still, what I would like to say is that the question itself becomes difficult to place if it is fixed that instrumentalism is coherent and also that we human beings exhibit reason giving and asking behavior that outstrips anything adequately described with the limited resources of instrumentalism. In that case, instrumentalism would capture how it is with Martian practical reason and yet fail to capture how it is with ours. But now what are we to make of the very question of instrumentalism's truth? Hopefully, this compressed line of thought can, when expanded, bring us closer to seeing the place for an analysis of the concept of practical reason on which it admits of species or forms; the various positions, e.g., instrumentalism, might then be seen as simply purported specifications of forms of agency. The tendency of the current literature is very different; it is to treat the various positions as articulations of competing conceptions of some single concept of practical reason. But this is all offstage here.
14. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen "Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 20. Limited space requires developing the incompatibility claim in the restricted context of formal principles; though I believe that a parallel point can be made in connection with substantive principles, our official results are nevertheless suitably restricted. That so much of the current debate about the content of the principles of practical reason gets played out in terms of a debate about what the formal principles are ensures that this restriction does not sever our discussion from the core of the current discussion.
15. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), p. 48.
16. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, reprinted in Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, ed. Stephen Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 35.
17. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, reprinted in Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, ed. Stephen Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 35.
18. Ibid., p. 36.
19. Rousseau, p. 48.
20. I allude to Wittgenstein's famous remark at sec. 258 of the Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) to suggest that he employs the logical interpretation in the course of attacking attempts to understand the content of "sensation language" on the model of private inner ostensive definition. His point there is that on such a picture "sensation language" could not provide a "criterion of correctness" and so could not be said to mean anything at all. It might be worth noting that what sits at the foundation of the projects Rousseau and Butler devastate is very much like the organizing impulse of the dispositional account of meaning or content Saul Kripke considers in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 22-37. While not interested in what it is to have a right, or what it is to follow nature, Kripke is nevertheless investigating something normative-in particular, the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning. The dispositionalist answer is that facts about how a language user is disposed to use an expression determine the meaning of the expression. Kripke argues that the dispositional view is ultimately an equation of performance and correctness and, for this reason, can't make sense of the possibility of mistake. This, in turn, reveals that the dispositionalist can't meet a basic condition of adequacy on accounts of meaning-namely, that any candidate for the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the normativity of meaning, i.e., must contain a specification of the correct use of that word. In the end, each of the views attacked aims at grounding and explaining the relevant norms in baldly naturalistic and reductive terms, and each consequently washes up on the logical interpretation of the error constraint. Although I have not touched on revealed preference theory or its connection with the theory of rational choice, it seems clear that the criticisms this coupling has undergone in, say, the work of Simon Blackburn and David Gauthier are of the Butler-Rousseau type. See Blackburn's "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind 104 (1995): 695-711, as well as his Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 161-68. And see Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-29.
21. I allude to Wittgenstein's famous remark at sec. 258 of the Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) to suggest that he employs the logical interpretation in the course of attacking attempts to understand the content of "sensation language" on the model of private inner ostensive definition. His point there is that on such a picture "sensation language" could not provide a "criterion of correctness" and so could not be said to mean anything at all. It might be worth noting that what sits at the foundation of the projects Rousseau and Butler devastate is very much like the organizing impulse of the dispositional account of meaning or content Saul Kripke considers in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 22-37. While not interested in what it is to have a right, or what it is to follow nature, Kripke is nevertheless investigating something normative-in particular, the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning. The dispositionalist answer is that facts about how a language user is disposed to use an expression determine the meaning of the expression. Kripke argues that the dispositional view is ultimately an equation of performance and correctness and, for this reason, can't make sense of the possibility of mistake. This, in turn, reveals that the dispositionalist can't meet a basic condition of adequacy on accounts of meaning-namely, that any candidate for the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the normativity of meaning, i.e., must contain a specification of the correct use of that word. In the end, each of the views attacked aims at grounding and explaining the relevant norms in baldly naturalistic and reductive terms, and each consequently washes up on the logical interpretation of the error constraint. Although I have not touched on revealed preference theory or its connection with the theory of rational choice, it seems clear that the criticisms this coupling has undergone in, say, the work of Simon Blackburn and David Gauthier are of the Butler-Rousseau type. See Blackburn's "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind 104 (1995): 695-711, as well as his Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 161-68. And see Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-29.
22. I allude to Wittgenstein's famous remark at sec. 258 of the Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) to suggest that he employs the logical interpretation in the course of attacking attempts to understand the content of "sensation language" on the model of private inner ostensive definition. His point there is that on such a picture "sensation language" could not provide a "criterion of correctness" and so could not be said to mean anything at all. It might be worth noting that what sits at the foundation of the projects Rousseau and Butler devastate is very much like the organizing impulse of the dispositional account of meaning or content Saul Kripke considers in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 22-37. While not interested in what it is to have a right, or what it is to follow nature, Kripke is nevertheless investigating something normative-in particular, the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning. The dispositionalist answer is that facts about how a language user is disposed to use an expression determine the meaning of the expression. Kripke argues that the dispositional view is ultimately an equation of performance and correctness and, for this reason, can't make sense of the possibility of mistake. This, in turn, reveals that the dispositionalist can't meet a basic condition of adequacy on accounts of meaning-namely, that any candidate for the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the normativity of meaning, i.e., must contain a specification of the correct use of that word. In the end, each of the views attacked aims at grounding and explaining the relevant norms in baldly naturalistic and reductive terms, and each consequently washes up on the logical interpretation of the error constraint. Although I have not touched on revealed preference theory or its connection with the theory of rational choice, it seems clear that the criticisms this coupling has undergone in, say, the work of Simon Blackburn and David Gauthier are of the Butler-Rousseau type. See Blackburn's "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind 104 (1995): 695-711, as well as his Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 161-68. And see Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-29.
23. I allude to Wittgenstein's famous remark at sec. 258 of the Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) to suggest that he employs the logical interpretation in the course of attacking attempts to understand the content of "sensation language" on the model of private inner ostensive definition. His point there is that on such a picture "sensation language" could not provide a "criterion of correctness" and so could not be said to mean anything at all. It might be worth noting that what sits at the foundation of the projects Rousseau and Butler devastate is very much like the organizing impulse of the dispositional account of meaning or content Saul Kripke considers in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 22-37. While not interested in what it is to have a right, or what it is to follow nature, Kripke is nevertheless investigating something normative-in particular, the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning. The dispositionalist answer is that facts about how a language user is disposed to use an expression determine the meaning of the expression. Kripke argues that the dispositional view is ultimately an equation of performance and correctness and, for this reason, can't make sense of the possibility of mistake. This, in turn, reveals that the dispositionalist can't meet a basic condition of adequacy on accounts of meaning-namely, that any candidate for the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the normativity of meaning, i.e., must contain a specification of the correct use of that word. In the end, each of the views attacked aims at grounding and explaining the relevant norms in baldly naturalistic and reductive terms, and each consequently washes up on the logical interpretation of the error constraint. Although I have not touched on revealed preference theory or its connection with the theory of rational choice, it seems clear that the criticisms this coupling has undergone in, say, the work of Simon Blackburn and David Gauthier are of the Butler-Rousseau type. See Blackburn's "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind 104 (1995): 695-711, as well as his Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 161-68. And see Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-29.
24. I allude to Wittgenstein's famous remark at sec. 258 of the Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) to suggest that he employs the logical interpretation in the course of attacking attempts to understand the content of "sensation language" on the model of private inner ostensive definition. His point there is that on such a picture "sensation language" could not provide a "criterion of correctness" and so could not be said to mean anything at all. It might be worth noting that what sits at the foundation of the projects Rousseau and Butler devastate is very much like the organizing impulse of the dispositional account of meaning or content Saul Kripke considers in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 22-37. While not interested in what it is to have a right, or what it is to follow nature, Kripke is nevertheless investigating something normative-in particular, the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning. The dispositionalist answer is that facts about how a language user is disposed to use an expression determine the meaning of the expression. Kripke argues that the dispositional view is ultimately an equation of performance and correctness and, for this reason, can't make sense of the possibility of mistake. This, in turn, reveals that the dispositionalist can't meet a basic condition of adequacy on accounts of meaning-namely, that any candidate for the fact in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the normativity of meaning, i.e., must contain a specification of the correct use of that word. In the end, each of the views attacked aims at grounding and explaining the relevant norms in baldly naturalistic and reductive terms, and each consequently washes up on the logical interpretation of the error constraint. Although I have not touched on revealed preference theory or its connection with the theory of rational choice, it seems clear that the criticisms this coupling has undergone in, say, the work of Simon Blackburn and David Gauthier are of the Butler-Rousseau type. See Blackburn's "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind 104 (1995): 695-711, as well as his Ruling Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 161-68. And see Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 26-29.
25. Elsewhere I would complain about this way of describing instrumentalism and its conception of end-oriented agency, but such complaints would be a distraction here. See my "There Is No Such Thing as the Instrumental Principle" (unpublished manuscript, University of Pittsburgh, 2003).
26. Dreier, p. 99.
27. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 252.
28. Ibid., pp. 220, 251, 231.
29. Melissa Barry raised the possibility of this reading of Korsgaard's argument in helpful comments on an ancestor of this essay. For Korsgaard's explicit endorsement of imperativalism, see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 236 and 240, as well as The Sources of Normativity, pp. 29-30, 137-38, 146, and 161-64.
30. Melissa Barry raised the possibility of this reading of Korsgaard's argument in helpful comments on an ancestor of this essay. For Korsgaard's explicit endorsement of imperativalism, see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 236 and 240, as well as The Sources of Normativity, pp. 29-30, 137-38, 146, and 161-64.
31. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 227.
32. What are the distinctively practical imperfections? An adequate answer to this question would require the specification of the forms of practical thought, the specification of the modes of reason in action. This is because if there is a kind of practical defect then there must be a kind of practical thought or form of practical reason correlated with it. If this is right, then we can't even begin to touch on a substantive characterization of the forms of practical defect. My thinking about the idea of distinctively practical error and defect has benefited from Stephen Engstrom's "Contradictions in the Will" (unpublished manuscript, University of Pittsburgh, 2001).
33. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 229, 228; Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 311-34, p. 318.
34. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 229, 228; Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 311-34, p. 318.
35. Among other things, the second section of "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason" develops a complex argument for the claim that a purely instrumental agent can't be distinctively practically defective and, as a whole, has prompted much discussion. Two contributions to the discussion are especially relevant to the line of thought I am pursuing here. In "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," Donald Hubin argues that the crux of Korsgaard's argument against instrumentalism cannot be that it fails to meet the error constraint, or in Hubin's terms, that it fails to be "normatively demanding." This is because he sees how easily instrumentalism can meet both the logical interpretation and the weak imperatival interpretation. Nevertheless, Hubin does not see that Korsgaard's interest is in the strong imperatival interpretation, and thus, I think, he fails to address her real concern. David Sobel's "Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics 111 (2001): 461-92, also records the ease with which the instrumentalist can make sense of derivative error in action. Although Sobel expresses some concern about how the instrumentalist might meet what I am calling the strong imperatival interpretation, he does not develop an account of that. As I hope is obvious, I am instead recommending that the putative condition of agency be resisted. Elsewhere I suggest that behind the strong imperatival interpretation is the thought that action is not the upshot of theoretical reason operating with a special set of contents-"mince pie syllogizing" as Anscombe puts it-but, rather, the upshot of a rational capacity of an entirely different kind. When conjoined with the intuition that kinds of rational capacity are in some sense tightly connected with kinds of error, we come close to the strong imperatival interpretation. However, we can capture the heart of the intuition without making imperativalist commitments by appeal to the much weaker practical defect constraint, for every kind of practical thought there is a unique kind of practical defect connected with it. It is a further and nontrivial step to claim that each individual bearer of a capacity for thought of the relevant kind must potentially exhibit such a defect or really be able to mess up in the relevant way. This raises a further difficulty. In light of the practical defect constraint, someone might claim that Korsgaard's argument against instrumentalism appeals only to this and not at all to the imperatival interpretation. That is, someone might insist that Korsgaard's complaint with instrumentalism is that it can't make sense of the very idea of genuinely practical error. While there is little textual support for this interpretation, and much against it, there is good reason to reconstruct Korsgaard's argument along these lines, if only to see where it might ultimately go wrong. I pursue this project in "There Is No Such Thing as the Instrumental Principle."
36. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:19. Also see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412-14, and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-22. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Kant's writings are given in the notes by the volume and page number of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-).
37. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:19. Also see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412-14, and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-22. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Kant's writings are given in the notes by the volume and page number of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-).
38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:19. Also see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412-14, and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-22. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Kant's writings are given in the notes by the volume and page number of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-).
39. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:19. Also see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412-14, and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-22. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Kant's writings are given in the notes by the volume and page number of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-).
40. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:19. Also see Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412-14, and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-22. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All references to Kant's writings are given in the notes by the volume and page number of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-).
41. Kant, Groundwork, 4:412-14.
42. Ibid., p. 414.
43. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:222.
44. Kant, Groundwork, 4:414, italics mine. Of course, Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, and some might read his remarks about the good as having application only to categorical imperatives and the sublime rational capacities which underlie them. I am not reading him this way and think that the thought experiment described in the Critique of Practical Reason at 5:58-59 gives me some license to do so.
45. Kant, Groundwork, 4:414, italics mine. Of course, Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, and some might read his remarks about the good as having application only to categorical imperatives and the sublime rational capacities which underlie them. I am not reading him this way and think that the thought experiment described in the Critique of Practical Reason at 5:58-59 gives me some license to do so.
46. Kant, Groundwork, 4:413, 414, italics mine.
47. See, e.g., ibid., 4:412-14, and Metaphysics of Morals, 6:222.
48. See, e.g., ibid., 4:412-14, and Metaphysics of Morals, 6:222.
49. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:379.
50. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and rev. P. H. Nidditch, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 479.
51. For a helpful classification of substantive theses in the theory of practical reason going by the names of "internalism" and "externalism," see Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," and The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 9-12. Darwall is right that judgment internalism has figured prominently in contemporary arguments for practical noncognitivism. Still, as Darwall recognizes, the general orientation is not limited to noncognitivists. See, e.g., John Broome's "Reason and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71, suppl. (1997): 131-46. I have not argued for this restricted conception of action on deontic thoughts. Still, if it is correct, and if imperativalism is false, then we do not address reason's practicality at the fundamental level by addressing the question of judgment internalism.
52. For a helpful classification of substantive theses in the theory of practical reason going by the names of "internalism" and "externalism," see Stephen Darwall, "Internalism and Agency," and The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 9-12. Darwall is right that judgment internalism has figured prominently in contemporary arguments for practical noncognitivism. Still, as Darwall recognizes, the general orientation is not limited to noncognitivists. See, e.g., John Broome's "Reason and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71, suppl. (1997): 131-46. I have not argued for this restricted conception of action on deontic thoughts. Still, if it is correct, and if imperativalism is false, then we do not address reason's practicality at the fundamental level by addressing the question of judgment internalism.
53. John Searle employs strong imperativalism as a premise in an argument for a certain conception of freedom, what he calls "the gap," not worrying that it might itself be subject to challenge. See Searle, pp. 16-17, 66-67.
54. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 240.
55. Korsgaard's own writings do not indicate that she is entirely clear about the risk. There are many passages that suggest that she does not distinguish principles (rules, norms, standards, etc.) from imperatives ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 217, 236). She takes normativity to be a species of necessitation and suggests that necessitation is a component of any adequate account of how "reasons direct, guide, or obligate us to act or judge in certain ways" (The Sources of Normativity, p. 226). Recall that for Kant, necessitation is a feature of an imperfectly rational being's following a rational principle, and yet, she says that Kant exhibits confusion in holding that a perfectly rational will is both under laws of reason and not necessitated to follow them ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 239).
56. Korsgaard's own writings do not indicate that she is entirely clear about the risk. There are many passages that suggest that she does not distinguish principles (rules, norms, standards, etc.) from imperatives ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 217, 236). She takes normativity to be a species of necessitation and suggests that necessitation is a component of any adequate account of how "reasons direct, guide, or obligate us to act or judge in certain ways" (The Sources of Normativity, p. 226). Recall that for Kant, necessitation is a feature of an imperfectly rational being's following a rational principle, and yet, she says that Kant exhibits confusion in holding that a perfectly rational will is both under laws of reason and not necessitated to follow them ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 239).
57. Korsgaard's own writings do not indicate that she is entirely clear about the risk. There are many passages that suggest that she does not distinguish principles (rules, norms, standards, etc.) from imperatives ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 217, 236). She takes normativity to be a species of necessitation and suggests that necessitation is a component of any adequate account of how "reasons direct, guide, or obligate us to act or judge in certain ways" (The Sources of Normativity, p. 226). Recall that for Kant, necessitation is a feature of an imperfectly rational being's following a rational principle, and yet, she says that Kant exhibits confusion in holding that a perfectly rational will is both under laws of reason and not necessitated to follow them ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 239).
58. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 240.
59. Searle, p. 66.
60. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236, and "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 236.
61. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236, and "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 236.
62. The quotation is from Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Freedom of the Will," as cited in G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 6. Kant describes a similar case in the teleological argument of the opening pages of the Groundwork: "And if reason should have been given, over and above, to this favored creature, it must have served it only to contemplate the fortunate constitution of its nature, to admire this, to delight in it, and to be grateful for it to the beneficent cause, but not to submit its faculty of desire to that weak and deceptive guidance and meddle with nature's purpose. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical use and have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself a plan for happiness and for the means of attaining it. Nature would have taken upon itself the choice not only of ends but also of means and, with wise foresight, would have entrusted them both simply to instinct" (Groundwork, 4:395).
63. The quotation is from Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Freedom of the Will," as cited in G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 6. Kant describes a similar case in the teleological argument of the opening pages of the Groundwork: "And if reason should have been given, over and above, to this favored creature, it must have served it only to contemplate the fortunate constitution of its nature, to admire this, to delight in it, and to be grateful for it to the beneficent cause, but not to submit its faculty of desire to that weak and deceptive guidance and meddle with nature's purpose. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical use and have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself a plan for happiness and for the means of attaining it. Nature would have taken upon itself the choice not only of ends but also of means and, with wise foresight, would have entrusted them both simply to instinct" (Groundwork, 4:395).
64. The slide is easy to make. In the course of elaborating his earlier remark about the impossibility of a "perfectly rational machine," Searle says, "A computer is neither rational nor irrational because its behavior is entirely determined by its program and the structure of its hardware. The only sense in which a computer can be said to be rational is observer-relative" (pp. 66-67). Here Searle shifts from complaining about the absence of "the possibility of behaving irrationally" to complaining that the behavior is entirely determined by nonrational elements-very different grounds for holding that something is "outside the scope of rationality altogether."
65. It might help to forestall misunderstanding by begging the question for a moment. As I have it, a perfectly rational agent does what it does through the exercise of practical judgment. One way to start to spell this out is to say that a perfectly rational agent can ask and answer "Why?" questions as, say, these are characterized by Anscombe in Intention. In querying whether the possibility of error is essential to agency, I do not mean to query whether the possibility of reflection on one's reasons is essential to agency as this is exhibited in the asking and answering of "Why?" The ability to ask and answer such questions is sometimes linked to the ability to construct philosophical theories of practical reason. According to Korsgaard, ordinary reasoning and philosophical reasoning are absolutely continuous: "A person who starts out reasoning in some perfectly ordinary way ... finds himself on a route that has no natural stopping place short of the unconditioned Ideas of Reason and the metaphysical perplexities to which they sometimes lead" ("Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind," Ethics 109 [1998]: 49-66, p. 61). Kant seems to see matters along similar lines: the principle of morality "is really an obscurely thought metaphysics that is inherent in every human being because of his rational predisposition" (Metaphysics of Morals, 6:376). Of course, there are other, very different ideas about the degree of continuity of ordinary and philosophical reflection. I raise this immensely difficult and important topic merely to say that in urging us away from imperativalism, I do not mean to urge us away from or toward any particular view about the degree of continuity of ordinary deliberation and philosophical reflection. If such reflection is simply a continuation of ordinary deliberation, then the capacity for such reflection will be a noncontingent feature of being under a principle. If it is not, then it is much harder to see how a case for its noncontingency might be made out. In any case, these questions are simply left open by my investigation of practical reason and the possibility of error. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me to see the risk of conflating these issues.
66. It might help to forestall misunderstanding by begging the question for a moment. As I have it, a perfectly rational agent does what it does through the exercise of practical judgment. One way to start to spell this out is to say that a perfectly rational agent can ask and answer "Why?" questions as, say, these are characterized by Anscombe in Intention. In querying whether the possibility of error is essential to agency, I do not mean to query whether the possibility of reflection on one's reasons is essential to agency as this is exhibited in the asking and answering of "Why?" The ability to ask and answer such questions is sometimes linked to the ability to construct philosophical theories of practical reason. According to Korsgaard, ordinary reasoning and philosophical reasoning are absolutely continuous: "A person who starts out reasoning in some perfectly ordinary way ... finds himself on a route that has no natural stopping place short of the unconditioned Ideas of Reason and the metaphysical perplexities to which they sometimes lead" ("Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind," Ethics 109 [1998]: 49-66, p. 61). Kant seems to see matters along similar lines: the principle of morality "is really an obscurely thought metaphysics that is inherent in every human being because of his rational predisposition" (Metaphysics of Morals, 6:376). Of course, there are other, very different ideas about the degree of continuity of ordinary and philosophical reflection. I raise this immensely difficult and important topic merely to say that in urging us away from imperativalism, I do not mean to urge us away from or toward any particular view about the degree of continuity of ordinary deliberation and philosophical reflection. If such reflection is simply a continuation of ordinary deliberation, then the capacity for such reflection will be a noncontingent feature of being under a principle. If it is not, then it is much harder to see how a case for its noncontingency might be made out. In any case, these questions are simply left open by my investigation of practical reason and the possibility of error. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me to see the risk of conflating these issues.
67. I owe the instructive challenge as well as the specific suggestion to an anonymous referee.
68. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 240.
69. Ibid. At certain points Korsgaard takes herself to be involved in a dispute with Kant about how to understand the capacity to resist: "Kant apparently identified our capacity to resist the dictates of reason with the imperfection of the human will" ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 239). I think it is unlikely, however, that Kant would accept that there is such a capacity, ability, or power. See n. 48 below.
70. Ibid. At certain points Korsgaard takes herself to be involved in a dispute with Kant about how to understand the capacity to resist: "Kant apparently identified our capacity to resist the dictates of reason with the imperfection of the human will" ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 239). I think it is unlikely, however, that Kant would accept that there is such a capacity, ability, or power. See n. 48 below.
71. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 97.
72. In the context of a distinct but closely related inquiry-one about the nature of "moral responsibility" rather than practical rule following-Susan Wolf describes a kind of agent that is free in this very sense: "The autonomous agent must be one who is able to act in accordance with Reason or not. That is, she must be able to regard the rational course of action, insofar as there is one, as just one alternative among others. ... This ability to choose among the rational, irrational, and nonrational alternatives alike is not an ability to choose on some higher-than-rational basis. Rather, it is an ability to choose on no basis whatsoever, an ability, if you will, to choose whether to use any basis for (subsequent) choice at all" (Freedom within Reason [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 54). While I object to Wolf's attribution of this position to Kant - Metaphysics of Morals, 6:226-27, is decisive evidence that he does not hold it - I accept her characterization of just how radical it is. In the course of considering various arguments for the claim that something must be radically "autonomous" in order for it to be a possible locus of "moral responsibility," there is one which Wolf raises only to leave to the side: "A second possibility is that those who continue to insist that radical autonomy is necessary for responsibility do so not because they disagree with my view that the ability to act in accordance with Reason is sufficient for responsibility but because they think that this ability itself requires at least a kind of radical autonomy" (Freedom within Reason, pp. 61-62). The imperativalist, I think, might then be seen as arguing for "autonomism" on similar grounds, and this essay might be seen as a contribution to Wolf's defense of what she calls the Reason View.
73. In the context of a distinct but closely related inquiry-one about the nature of "moral responsibility" rather than practical rule following-Susan Wolf describes a kind of agent that is free in this very sense: "The autonomous agent must be one who is able to act in accordance with Reason or not. That is, she must be able to regard the rational course of action, insofar as there is one, as just one alternative among others. ... This ability to choose among the rational, irrational, and nonrational alternatives alike is not an ability to choose on some higher-than-rational basis. Rather, it is an ability to choose on no basis whatsoever, an ability, if you will, to choose whether to use any basis for (subsequent) choice at all" (Freedom within Reason [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 54). While I object to Wolf's attribution of this position to Kant - Metaphysics of Morals, 6:226-27, is decisive evidence that he does not hold it - I accept her characterization of just how radical it is. In the course of considering various arguments for the claim that something must be radically "autonomous" in order for it to be a possible locus of "moral responsibility," there is one which Wolf raises only to leave to the side: "A second possibility is that those who continue to insist that radical autonomy is necessary for responsibility do so not because they disagree with my view that the ability to act in accordance with Reason is sufficient for responsibility but because they think that this ability itself requires at least a kind of radical autonomy" (Freedom within Reason, pp. 61-62). The imperativalist, I think, might then be seen as arguing for "autonomism" on similar grounds, and this essay might be seen as a contribution to Wolf's defense of what she calls the Reason View.
74. In the context of a distinct but closely related inquiry-one about the nature of "moral responsibility" rather than practical rule following-Susan Wolf describes a kind of agent that is free in this very sense:
75. The matters are somewhat narrower because Reinhold and Kant reserve the concept of freedom for characterizing a being with distinctively moral capacities, while in our discussion a being with any practically rational capacity is free or active in some sense. The matters are closely related because in every case we are concerned with the conditions of being under rational norms. It is just that they reserve the concept of freedom for characterizing the species or form of activity characteristic of beings with moral capacities.
76. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:226.
77. For discussion of the central importance of this passage in Kant's practical philosophy, see Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 129-36, and also see Allen Wood's essay "Kant's Compatibilism," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 73-101, pp. 79-83. Notably the passage also figures in Korsgaard's own sympathetic interpretation of Kant in "Morality as Freedom," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 159-87. This suggests that she will resist the attribution of the liberty of indifference conception of freedom which, of course, is fine, though I do not see how she can distance herself while continuing to maintain imperativalism. I return to this tension in Sec. VIII.
78. For discussion of the central importance of this passage in Kant's practical philosophy, see Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 129-36, and also see Allen Wood's essay "Kant's Compatibilism," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 73-101, pp. 79-83. Notably the passage also figures in Korsgaard's own sympathetic interpretation of Kant in "Morality as Freedom," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 159-87. This suggests that she will resist the attribution of the liberty of indifference conception of freedom which, of course, is fine, though I do not see how she can distance herself while continuing to maintain imperativalism. I return to this tension in Sec. VIII.
79. For discussion of the central importance of this passage in Kant's practical philosophy, see Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 129-36, and also see Allen Wood's essay "Kant's Compatibilism," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 73-101, pp. 79-83. Notably the passage also figures in Korsgaard's own sympathetic interpretation of Kant in "Morality as Freedom," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 159-87. This suggests that she will resist the attribution of the liberty of indifference conception of freedom which, of course, is fine, though I do not see how she can distance herself while continuing to maintain imperativalism. I return to this tension in Sec. VIII.
80. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 248.
81. Ibid., p. 240. See the passage quoted at length at the beginning of Sec. V above.
82. Although I am using the expression "capacity to resist," I think we are in some sense already on the wrong track when doing so. A capacity, ability, or power is, I would like to say, always something, in some sense, good. Indeed, one way of putting the underlying sentiment of this essay is that the idea of a capacity or power to resist reason is a confusion on the order of the idea of a capacity not to see, or the treatment of blindness as itself a capacity. See Wood's "Kant's Compatibilism," pp. 81-82, for an interesting discussion of this sense of "capacity." For the parallel between irrationality and blindness, see Saint Anselm's "The Fall of Satan," in Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues, ed. and trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), sec. 11.
83. Although I am using the expression "capacity to resist," I think we are in some sense already on the wrong track when doing so. A capacity, ability, or power is, I would like to say, always something, in some sense, good. Indeed, one way of putting the underlying sentiment of this essay is that the idea of a capacity or power to resist reason is a confusion on the order of the idea of a capacity not to see, or the treatment of blindness as itself a capacity. See Wood's "Kant's Compatibilism," pp. 81-82, for an interesting discussion of this sense of "capacity." For the parallel between irrationality and blindness, see Saint Anselm's "The Fall of Satan," in Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues, ed. and trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), sec. 11.
84. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 240.
85. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:32.
86. I have not shown that these are the only terms in which to develop a conception of an ideal agent. So, strictly speaking, I have not proved that no conception of the ideal agent is available to the imperativalist. But what are the alternatives?
87. Anselm, p. 122.
88. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236. Also see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 243, "Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self," p. 65, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 12-15, and her unpublished "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity," delivered as the John Locke Lectures (Oxford University, 2002), which develops this theme in great detail.
89. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236. Also see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 243, "Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self," p. 65, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 12-15, and her unpublished "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity," delivered as the John Locke Lectures (Oxford University, 2002), which develops this theme in great detail.
90. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236. Also see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 243, "Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self," p. 65, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 12-15, and her unpublished "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity," delivered as the John Locke Lectures (Oxford University, 2002), which develops this theme in great detail.
91. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236. Also see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 243, "Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self," p. 65, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 12-15, and her unpublished "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity," delivered as the John Locke Lectures (Oxford University, 2002), which develops this theme in great detail.
92. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 236. Also see "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 243, "Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self," p. 65, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 12-15, and her unpublished "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity," delivered as the John Locke Lectures (Oxford University, 2002), which develops this theme in great detail.
93. What I am calling constitutivism has been explored recently, though in very different ways and under different headings, by others: Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); David Gauthier, "The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant," Ethics 96 (1985): 74-88; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Railton; David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the constitutivist, the class of formal principles contains those which are fundamental and those which are derivative, i.e., arrived at through the application of fundamental principles. The constitutivist is fixed on the fundamental principles, but with an interest in understanding the basis of those derived from it. It is important to note here that if the fundamental principles are not internal to agency, then neither are any of the principles derived from it.
94. What I am calling constitutivism has been explored recently, though in very different ways and under different headings, by others: Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); David Gauthier, "The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant," Ethics 96 (1985): 74-88; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Railton; David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the constitutivist, the class of formal principles contains those which are fundamental and those which are derivative, i.e., arrived at through the application of fundamental principles. The constitutivist is fixed on the fundamental principles, but with an interest in understanding the basis of those derived from it. It is important to note here that if the fundamental principles are not internal to agency, then neither are any of the principles derived from it.
95. What I am calling constitutivism has been explored recently, though in very different ways and under different headings, by others: Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); David Gauthier, "The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant," Ethics 96 (1985): 74-88; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Railton; David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the constitutivist, the class of formal principles contains those which are fundamental and those which are derivative, i.e., arrived at through the application of fundamental principles. The constitutivist is fixed on the fundamental principles, but with an interest in understanding the basis of those derived from it. It is important to note here that if the fundamental principles are not internal to agency, then neither are any of the principles derived from it.
96. What I am calling constitutivism has been explored recently, though in very different ways and under different headings, by others: Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); David Gauthier, "The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant," Ethics 96 (1985): 74-88; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Railton; David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the constitutivist, the class of formal principles contains those which are fundamental and those which are derivative, i.e., arrived at through the application of fundamental principles. The constitutivist is fixed on the fundamental principles, but with an interest in understanding the basis of those derived from it. It is important to note here that if the fundamental principles are not internal to agency, then neither are any of the principles derived from it.
97. A nonreductive realist, in my sense, holds that normative claims are truth-apt (against noncognitivism) and sometimes true (against an error theory) and denies that such truths are reducible to nonnormative truths. That is, a nonreductive realist in my sense holds that there are facts about what an agent ought to do and that these are not reducible to nonnormative facts. I have not argued that constitutivism is the only non-reductive and realist alternative to platonism but am following a plausible and well-developed tradition of carving up the possibilities, at least so far as formal principles go. Both Korsgaard and Derek Parfit seem to work with this picture of the options, though Parfit leans in the direction of platonism. See his "Reasons and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71, suppl. (1997): 99-130, esp. pp. 107-9.
98. But is constitutivism so promising? I should mention that many think that it inevitably runs into a terrible difficulty, one recently raised by R. Jay Wallace for Korsgaard ("Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," sec. 1) and also raised by Philip Clark for David Velleman ("Velleman's Autonomism." Ethics 111 [2001]: 580-93). To illustrate the problem, let's look at Clark's essay. There he criticizes Velleman's attempt to argue from a conception of the nature of action as an activity whose constitutive aim is autonomy to a conception of the standards governing action, on the following grounds: "Autonomy, as Velleman conceives it, is a goal that is achieved in every fully intentional action and so cannot serve as the standard of rational assessment for action" (p. 593). Velleman has subsequently expressed concern that there is a real problem here (Velleman, p. 30). And one might think that the difficulty is so forbidding that one should prefer imperativalism to having to resolve it. But what exactly is the source of the difficulty? Even with so much interesting work being done in the constitutivist tradition, we still lack, I think, a correct conception of the schema for such a position. In particular, we lack a correct conception of the logical form of the claims describing the essence or nature of agency, the claims in virtue of which we are supposed to understand the force of "oughts" applying to particular agents. The default tendency is to treat the description of essences as universal generalizations in which all members of the relevant kind are said to possess a property. Indeed, the difficulty arises for Velleman just when his description of the nature of action, i.e., his characterization of action's constitutive aim, is taken to have the underlying form of a universal generalization in which anything that is an action has the property of being autonomous. My thought is that the difficulty is not for the general constitutivist attempt to, as it were, understand norms in terms of natures, but only for a certain conception of the form of descriptions of natures or essences. A promising direction for the constitutivist to go, I think, is to resist the urge to assimilate such descriptions to universal generalizations and instead look toward generics to describe "the what it is" which is to serve to underwrite standards of assessment. For recent work in this direction, see the following: Julius Moravcsik, "Essences, Powers, and Generic Propositions," in Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M. L. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 229-44; Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Metal Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 247-96.
99. But is constitutivism so promising? I should mention that many think that it inevitably runs into a terrible difficulty, one recently raised by R. Jay Wallace for Korsgaard ("Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," sec. 1) and also raised by Philip Clark for David Velleman ("Velleman's Autonomism." Ethics 111 [2001]: 580-93). To illustrate the problem, let's look at Clark's essay. There he criticizes Velleman's attempt to argue from a conception of the nature of action as an activity whose constitutive aim is autonomy to a conception of the standards governing action, on the following grounds: "Autonomy, as Velleman conceives it, is a goal that is achieved in every fully intentional action and so cannot serve as the standard of rational assessment for action" (p. 593). Velleman has subsequently expressed concern that there is a real problem here (Velleman, p. 30). And one might think that the difficulty is so forbidding that one should prefer imperativalism to having to resolve it. But what exactly is the source of the difficulty? Even with so much interesting work being done in the constitutivist tradition, we still lack, I think, a correct conception of the schema for such a position. In particular, we lack a correct conception of the logical form of the claims describing the essence or nature of agency, the claims in virtue of which we are supposed to understand the force of "oughts" applying to particular agents. The default tendency is to treat the description of essences as universal generalizations in which all members of the relevant kind are said to possess a property. Indeed, the difficulty arises for Velleman just when his description of the nature of action, i.e., his characterization of action's constitutive aim, is taken to have the underlying form of a universal generalization in which anything that is an action has the property of being autonomous. My thought is that the difficulty is not for the general constitutivist attempt to, as it were, understand norms in terms of natures, but only for a certain conception of the form of descriptions of natures or essences. A promising direction for the constitutivist to go, I think, is to resist the urge to assimilate such descriptions to universal generalizations and instead look toward generics to describe "the what it is" which is to serve to underwrite standards of assessment. For recent work in this direction, see the following: Julius Moravcsik, "Essences, Powers, and Generic Propositions," in Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M. L. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 229-44; Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Metal Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 247-96.
100. But is constitutivism so promising? I should mention that many think that it inevitably runs into a terrible difficulty, one recently raised by R. Jay Wallace for Korsgaard ("Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," sec. 1) and also raised by Philip Clark for David Velleman ("Velleman's Autonomism." Ethics 111 [2001]: 580-93). To illustrate the problem, let's look at Clark's essay. There he criticizes Velleman's attempt to argue from a conception of the nature of action as an activity whose constitutive aim is autonomy to a conception of the standards governing action, on the following grounds: "Autonomy, as Velleman conceives it, is a goal that is achieved in every fully intentional action and so cannot serve as the standard of rational assessment for action" (p. 593). Velleman has subsequently expressed concern that there is a real problem here (Velleman, p. 30). And one might think that the difficulty is so forbidding that one should prefer imperativalism to having to resolve it. But what exactly is the source of the difficulty? Even with so much interesting work being done in the constitutivist tradition, we still lack, I think, a correct conception of the schema for such a position. In particular, we lack a correct conception of the logical form of the claims describing the essence or nature of agency, the claims in virtue of which we are supposed to understand the force of "oughts" applying to particular agents. The default tendency is to treat the description of essences as universal generalizations in which all members of the relevant kind are said to possess a property. Indeed, the difficulty arises for Velleman just when his description of the nature of action, i.e., his characterization of action's constitutive aim, is taken to have the underlying form of a universal generalization in which anything that is an action has the property of being autonomous. My thought is that the difficulty is not for the general constitutivist attempt to, as it were, understand norms in terms of natures, but only for a certain conception of the form of descriptions of natures or essences. A promising direction for the constitutivist to go, I think, is to resist the urge to assimilate such descriptions to universal generalizations and instead look toward generics to describe "the what it is" which is to serve to underwrite standards of assessment. For recent work in this direction, see the following: Julius Moravcsik, "Essences, Powers, and Generic Propositions," in Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and M. L. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 229-44; Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life," in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Metal Theory, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 247-96.