Buck-passing and the wrong kind of reasons

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 54, Issue 215, 2004, Pages 295-300

  Olson, Jonas ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944454786     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard UP, 1998), p. 97
2. Crisp, Review of Kupperman, Value ... and What Follows, Philosophy, 75 (2000), pp. 458-92, at p. 459
3. D'Arms and Jacobson, 'Sentiment and Value', Ethics, 110 (2000), pp. 722-48, at p. 731
4. Parfit, 'Rationality and Reasons', in D. Egonsson et al. (eds), Exploring Practical Philosophy: from Action to Values (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 17-39, at pp. 21-2
5. A similar view appears in A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), e.g., pp. 37, 52
6. For a forceful criticism of Gibbard's view, see D'Arms and Jacobson, 'Sentiment and Value', pp. 743-6
7. Broome, 'Reasons', in P. Pettit et al. (eds), Reason and Value: Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford UP, forthcoming)
8. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 97
9. Moore, 'The Conception of Intrinsic Value', in his Principia Ethica, ed. T. Baldwin (Cambridge UP, 1993), pp. 280-98, at p. 286
10. See, e.g., R. Audi's outline of what he calls 'axiological experientialism' in his Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford UP, 1997), pp. 251-9