Reasons and character

Ethics

Volumn 115, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 272-305

  Moreau, Sophia R ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 14544276437     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/426306     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 19.
2. This is, I believe, part of the point of Williams's example of the man who has "one thought too many." This man saves his wife over a stranger not just because she is his wife but also because he reflects that "in such situations as this, it is permissible to save one's wife." His reasoning contains one thought too many because it depends on a mistaken belief about the source of his practical reasons, a view that runs the inferences the wrong way. The man believes he has a reason to save his wife because morality permits it; but, in fact, for Williams, morality permits it because it is something that, given this man's deep attachment to his wife, he could not but do. His attachment to his wife functions as a constraint on what morality can require of him; and it does all the justificatory work, So he need not appeal to morality in justifying his action: to do so is to appeal to one thought too many. See ibid., p. 18.
3. See, among others, David Brink, "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 255-92; Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," and "Agency, Attachment and Difference," both in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 23-44 and 184-207, respectively; and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10 (particularly the section tided "Williams' Question").
4. See, among others, David Brink, "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 255-92; Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," and "Agency, Attachment and Difference," both in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 23-44 and 184-207, respectively; and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10 (particularly the section tided "Williams' Question").
5. See, among others, David Brink, "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 255-92; Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," and "Agency, Attachment and Difference," both in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 23-44 and 184-207, respectively; and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10 (particularly the section tided "Williams' Question").
6. This form of internalism should not be conflated with other positions that are often labeled 'internalist'. Rejection of this form of internalism is, for instance, quite consistent with acceptance of Christine Korsgaard's "internalism requirement" - namely, the claim that the demands of practical reason must be capable of motivating rational persons. See Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Reasons for Action," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 43. For clarification of what this form of internalism does and does not imply, see Derek Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 99-130.
7. This form of internalism should not be conflated with other positions that are often labeled 'internalist'. Rejection of this form of internalism is, for instance, quite consistent with acceptance of Christine Korsgaard's "internalism requirement" - namely, the claim that the demands of practical reason must be capable of motivating rational persons. See Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Reasons for Action," in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 43. For clarification of what this form of internalism does and does not imply, see Derek Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 99-130.
8. For this reason, any analysis of character traits will be inadequate if it reduces them to frequencies of behavior or to settled dispositions to behave in certain ways. Such "summary" or "frequentative" analyses of character are criticized in greater detail by Richard Brandt in "Traits of Character," American Philosophical Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1970): 23-37; and by Philippa Foot in "Virtue Ethics" (unpublished manuscript, Oxford University, n.d.), pp. 2-4.
9. For this reason, any analysis of character traits will be inadequate if it reduces them to frequencies of behavior or to settled dispositions to behave in certain ways. Such "summary" or "frequentative" analyses of character are criticized in greater detail by Richard Brandt in "Traits of Character," American Philosophical Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1970): 23-37; and by Philippa Foot in "Virtue Ethics" (unpublished manuscript, Oxford University, n.d.), pp. 2-4.
10. This may explain some philosophers' skepticism about the idea of character and may also help to motivate such purely behavioral analyses as are mentioned in n. 5. Talk of an action "belonging to a person" or belonging "in a deep way" can give the impression that appeals to character presuppose a fixed or substantial self that stands behind a person's various psychological and physical dispositions, perhaps as their cause. But such a self is not presupposed by the conception of character I defend in this article; nor is it presupposed by any of the alternative views I discuss. All of these views reduce character to a certain set of dispositions - and, as I hope my discussion will show, the interesting question is how to understand the form and content of these dispositions, not whether anything lies behind them.
11. Bernard Williams, "Practical Necessity," in Moral Luck, p. 130.
12. This point is familiar from recent discussions of Kant. See, in particular, Christine Korsgaard's discussion of what is involved in distinguishing yourself as an agent from the operation of your desires in you in her "Reply" in The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 219-58.
13. Richard Moran suggests this in "Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life," in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 189-217, pp. 198-99.
14. For discussion of this and other senses in which we seem passive with respect to our characters, see Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," pp. 58-68, "The Problem of Action," pp. 69-79, "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 80-94, and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," pp. 159-76, all in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 211-29.
15. For discussion of this and other senses in which we seem passive with respect to our characters, see Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," pp. 58-68, "The Problem of Action," pp. 69-79, "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 80-94, and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," pp. 159-76, all in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 211-29.
16. For discussion of this and other senses in which we seem passive with respect to our characters, see Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," pp. 58-68, "The Problem of Action," pp. 69-79, "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 80-94, and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," pp. 159-76, all in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 211-29.
17. For discussion of this and other senses in which we seem passive with respect to our characters, see Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," pp. 58-68, "The Problem of Action," pp. 69-79, "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 80-94, and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," pp. 159-76, all in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 211-29.
18. For discussion of this and other senses in which we seem passive with respect to our characters, see Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," pp. 58-68, "The Problem of Action," pp. 69-79, "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 80-94, and "Identification and Wholeheartedness," pp. 159-76, all in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Joseph Raz, "When We Are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 71 (1997): 211-29.
19. This form of necessity is discussed by Williams, who refers to it alternately as "Practical Necessity" and as "Moral Incapacity," in two papers of these titles that appear, respectively, in Moral Luck, pp. 124-31; and in Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 46-55. It is also discussed by Harry Frankfurt, who refers to it as "the unthinkable" in "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 117-90.
20. This form of necessity is discussed by Williams, who refers to it alternately as "Practical Necessity" and as "Moral Incapacity," in two papers of these titles that appear, respectively, in Moral Luck, pp. 124-31; and in Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 46-55. It is also discussed by Harry Frankfurt, who refers to it as "the unthinkable" in "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 117-90.
21. This form of necessity is discussed by Williams, who refers to it alternately as "Practical Necessity" and as "Moral Incapacity," in two papers of these titles that appear, respectively, in Moral Luck, pp. 124-31; and in Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 46-55. It is also discussed by Harry Frankfurt, who refers to it as "the unthinkable" in "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 117-90.
22. One can quite consistently reject the idea that a person's character traits are in some special sense "her own" and yet continue to affirm that character traits have an explanatory function. One might hold, as I have suggested above, that they tell us about the agent's purposes, and hence, help to explain her behavior; but one might deny that they thereby tell us anything more about her than do the acrophobia or the proneness to indigestion that also help to explain her behavior.
23. See Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 2, scene 1.
24. See, e.g., Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. chap. 5, and "Impersonality, Character and Moral Expressivism," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 578-95; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 9-11.
25. See, e.g., Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. chap. 5, and "Impersonality, Character and Moral Expressivism," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 578-95; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 9-11.
26. See, e.g., Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. chap. 5, and "Impersonality, Character and Moral Expressivism," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 578-95; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 9-11.
27. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chaps. 1 and 6; also "Practical Necessity," pp. 129-31, and "Moral Incapacity," p. 47.
28. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chaps. 1 and 6; also "Practical Necessity," pp. 129-31, and "Moral Incapacity," p. 47.
29. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chaps. 1 and 6; also "Practical Necessity," pp. 129-31, and "Moral Incapacity," p. 47.
30. Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," p. 14.
31. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck, p. 105.
32. We sometimes say that a person "desired" to do a certain thing when what we mean is only that he was moved to do it: "desired" is here simply a shorthand for "was moved." In Williams's sense of 'desire', the desire operative here would be the psychological state that resulted in the person's being moved. We also say that a person "desired" to do something when what we mean is that he came to want to do it because he recognized some further fact that made it seem desirable: we are then referring to what Nagel calls a "motivated desire." In such cases, the desire would, for Williams, be the recognition of the further fact, for this is really what functions as the source of motivation.
33. This qualification is important, for it means that to be motivated, we need not actually be moved. For ease of discussion, I shall not always repeat the qualification, but it should be kept in mind.
34. Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity, p. 35. For Williams's understanding of what the soundness of a deliberative route requires, see p. 36, as well as pp. 186-94, of his "Replies" in World, Mind and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
35. Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity, p. 35. For Williams's understanding of what the soundness of a deliberative route requires, see p. 36, as well as pp. 186-94, of his "Replies" in World, Mind and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
36. This constitutive view is stronger than the thesis that all reasons are internal, in two respects. According to the internal reasons thesis, these motivational facts are necessary conditions for the person's having a reason. But on the constitutive view, they are also (i) jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the very facts in which these reasons consist. I ascribe this constitutive view to Williams because he suggests repeatedly that all that what we mean, when we ascribe reasons to ourselves and others, is that if the agent deliberated rationally, he would be motivated - and he suggests that we are correct to suppose this. See Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," p. 109.
37. It is, of course, logically possible that some of the desires that would survive a person's rational scrutiny are fleeting ones and, hence, that some reasons would be provided by desires that do not form a part of his character. But as long as the procedural constraints that Williams has in mind are holistic - such that the scrutiny of one desire necessarily involves reference to our other desires - then it seems unlikely that most fleeting desires would survive it. For any such desire that was at odds with enough of the person's other desires would be ruled out when he considered its weight relative to the combined weights of the other desires, (Interestingly, this points to a possible problem for Williams's account. It is not clear how his account could explain our coming, through deliberation, to desire something new when this new desire conflicts with strong existing desires of ours. Williams has suggested that it is the external reasons theorist who has trouble explaining the acquisition of new motivations. But Williams's view may encounter its own difficulties here. If the rationality of having a certain desire depends not upon facts about its object but simply upon whether we want to have it or whether having it has effects that we want, then how could we ever come to think it rational to develop a certain desire when this desire conflicts with strong existing desires of ours?)
38. This is, for instance, the strategy taken by Christine Korsgaard in "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 15-16, and in the draft version of her 2002 Locke Lectures, "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity" (delivered at Oxford, May-June 2002; as yet unpublished). Korsgaard argues here that whenever we act, we take our maxim to have the form of a law. The action is a genuine, or successful action, only when its maxim really does have the form of a law. So irrational action is failed action. It is not a process different from the process that constitutes action, since it is still a matter of searching for a maxim that has a lawlike form. But since its maxim fails to achieve that form, it does not succeed as action. And in this sense, it is not really action at all.
39. This is, for instance, the strategy taken by Christine Korsgaard in "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 1-29, esp. pp. 15-16, and in the draft version of her 2002 Locke Lectures, "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity" (delivered at Oxford, May-June 2002; as yet unpublished). Korsgaard argues here that whenever we act, we take our maxim to have the form of a law. The action is a genuine, or successful action, only when its maxim really does have the form of a law. So irrational action is failed action. It is not a process different from the process that constitutes action, since it is still a matter of searching for a maxim that has a lawlike form. But since its maxim fails to achieve that form, it does not succeed as action. And in this sense, it is not really action at all.
40. See Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," and "Identification and Externality," in The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 11-25 and pp. 58-68. This is not the analysis that Frankfurt now favors. He now analyzes identification as a kind of decision. I shall discuss the relevance of one sort of decision presently.
41. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," p. 17.
42. Proponents of quasi-realism would contest this claim. They would argue that, although it is true that no facts independent of our own desires or motivations enter into the correct account of what we are doing when we engage in practical reasoning, nevertheless, the norms we invoke from within the practice of practical reasoning do not treat our own psychological states as reason giving. Hence, from within this practice, it is not appropriate to treat our own psychological states as the facts that give us reasons. I discuss the problems that arise for this variant of the desire-based view below.
43. The problem of authenticity was first discussed by Gary Watson in "Free Agency," in free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 96-110, pp. 108-9.
44. A suggestion that has been made and developed by Frankfurt, in revision of his earlier views. See Frankfurt, "Identification and Externality," esp. pp. 170-74. My discussion will focus on Williams's somewhat different use of the idea of decision making.
45. Williams, "Moral Incapacity," p. 52.
46. See, e.g., Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), and "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," and "How to Be an Ethical Anti-realist," both in Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 149-65 and 166-81, respectively.
47. See, e.g., Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), and "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," and "How to Be an Ethical Anti-realist," both in Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 149-65 and 166-81, respectively.
48. Blackburn, "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," p. 153.
49. See, e.g., P. T. Geatch, "Assertion," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-65; G. F. Schueler, "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism," Ethics 98 (1988): 501-17; and Bob Hale, "The Compleat Projectivist," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 65-85, and "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Reality, Representation and Projection, ed. Crispin Wright and John Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Blackburn's reply, see "Attitudes and Contents," in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-97.
50. See, e.g., P. T. Geatch, "Assertion," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-65; G. F. Schueler, "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism," Ethics 98 (1988): 501-17; and Bob Hale, "The Compleat Projectivist," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 65-85, and "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Reality, Representation and Projection, ed. Crispin Wright and John Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Blackburn's reply, see "Attitudes and Contents," in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-97.
51. See, e.g., P. T. Geatch, "Assertion," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-65; G. F. Schueler, "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism," Ethics 98 (1988): 501-17; and Bob Hale, "The Compleat Projectivist," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 65-85, and "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Reality, Representation and Projection, ed. Crispin Wright and John Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Blackburn's reply, see "Attitudes and Contents," in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-97.
52. See, e.g., P. T. Geatch, "Assertion," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-65; G. F. Schueler, "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism," Ethics 98 (1988): 501-17; and Bob Hale, "The Compleat Projectivist," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 65-85, and "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Reality, Representation and Projection, ed. Crispin Wright and John Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Blackburn's reply, see "Attitudes and Contents," in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-97.
53. See, e.g., P. T. Geatch, "Assertion," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-65; G. F. Schueler, "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism," Ethics 98 (1988): 501-17; and Bob Hale, "The Compleat Projectivist," Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 65-85, and "Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Reality, Representation and Projection, ed. Crispin Wright and John Haldane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For Blackburn's reply, see "Attitudes and Contents," in Essays in Quasi-Realism, pp. 182-97.
54. This strategy is openly acknowledged and explained by Blackburn in "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," at p. 153. The example of bearbaiting, which I use below, is drawn from this discussion of Blackburn's.
55. Williams, "Moral Incapacity," p. 51.
56. At least, assuming that I do not suffer from akrasia, or from some sort of motivational defect. There is a sense, then, in which even on the reason-based account, I am only active if I do not suffer from certain failures of rationality. But the rational constraints that are required by this account of activity are much weaker than those that are required by Williams's desire-based conception - for on that conception, as we saw, a person's judgments about his reasons can only reflect his activity if they are in fact correct.
57. This point owes much to Richard Moran's discussion in "Impersonality, Character and Moral Expressivism." Moran, however, does not distinguish between what I have called the "problem of evaluation" and the "paradox of explanation." And, perhaps because of this, he treats the paradox of explanation as a problem that is more compatible with Williams's view than I believe it is. As I shall argue presently, Williams's view can account for the problem of evaluation; but it cannot resolve, or even allow for the appearance of, the paradox of explanation.
58. This may explain the tendency, in recent discussions of normative ethics, to focus exclusively on the first-personal and third-personal points of view and to ignore the second-person. One who is tacitly proceeding from a desire-based view of reasons will naturally assume that these are the only two points of view from which we could evaluate a particular judgment about our practical reasons.
59. It also explains why we can sometimes (though not always) unproblematically refer to our own character traits in explaining our past actions. According to the reason-based account of character, if it is appropriate simply to cite your character traits in explaining your past actions, this is because it is appropriate for you to take a third-personal stance on your judgments about your reasons and to regard them simply as psychological facts about yourself, and not as judgments that you endorse. This may be because, over time, you have come to think differently. You now no longer endorse these judgments about your reasons, so you can treat them simply as psychological facts about you. Alternatively, it may be because your interlocutor is not asking you for a justification of your past action. He is simply trying to understand it as the type of action that someone with your psychological dispositions would perform, in which case, you can satisfactorily answer his question by referring only to your character traits even if you still endorse your past judgments about your reasons.
60. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 10.
61. See Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
62. See Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
63. See Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).