Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 121-153

  Horgan, Terry ^a   Timmons, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84980019510     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568640009485069     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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