Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself

Nature Communications

Volumn 5, Issue , 2014, Pages

  FeldmanHall, Oriel ^a   Sokol Hessner, Peter ^a   Van Bavel, Jay J ^a   Phelps, Elizabeth A ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATHAN S KLINE INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL JUSTICE; VIOLENCE;

ARTICLE; COMPENSATION; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; JUSTICE; NORMAL HUMAN; PUNISHMENT; EGO; FEMALE; GAME; MALE; SOCIAL JUSTICE; YOUNG ADULT;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; EGO; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MALE; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL JUSTICE; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84921852429     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20411723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms6306     Document Type: Article

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