A behavioral perspective on the governance of common resources

Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability

Volumn 12, Issue , 2015, Pages 1-5

  Janssen, Marco A ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; RESOURCE USE; SUSTAINABILITY; THEORETICAL STUDY; BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE; BIOPHYSICS; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84921381453     PISSN: 18773435     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cosust.2014.08.002     Document Type: Review

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