Water externalities: Tragedy of the common canal

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1142-1162

  Holt, Charles A ^a   Johnson, Cathleen A ^b   Mallow, Courtney A ^c   Sullivani, Sean P ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b BASIS Educational Group   (United States)

^c Management   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861801243     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-78.4.1142     Document Type: Article

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