The role of information in governing the commons: Experimental results

Ecology and Society

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2013, Pages

  Janssen, Marco A ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Communication; Conditional cooperation; Information; Institutions

Indexed keywords

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 84891839403     PISSN: None     EISSN: 17083087     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5751/ES-05664-180404     Document Type: Article

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