Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks

Ecological Economics

Volumn 90, Issue , 2013, Pages 29-40

  Kimbrough, Erik O ^a   Wilson, Bart J ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ecological shocks; Experimental economics; Rules

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT; ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS; ECONOMIC THEORY; ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE; GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION; HISTORICAL RECORD; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; LABORATORY METHOD; PROPERTY MARKET;

EID: 84875796125     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.02.008     Document Type: Article

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