Cultural norms, cooperation, and communication: Taking experiments to the field in indigenous communities

International Journal of the Commons

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 498-520

  Ghate, Rucha ^a   Ghate, Suresh ^b   Ostrom, Elinor ^c  

^a International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development ICIMOD   (Nepal)

^b RTM NAGPUR UNIVERSITY   (India)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Common pool resources; Forestry; India; Institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883357913     PISSN: 18750281     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18352/ijc.376     Document Type: Article

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