Fair pricing in the sky: Truthful frequency allocation with dynamic spectrum supply

Proceedings - International Conference on Network Protocols, ICNP

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 245-256

  Sun, Qihang ^a   Wang, Qian ^a   Ren, Kui ^b   Jia, Xiaohua ^c  

^a WUHAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; FREQUENCY ALLOCATION; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; REUSABILITY;

DYNAMIC SPECTRUM; ONLINE AUCTIONS; PRICE FAIRNESS; SIGNAL TRANSMISSION; SOCIAL WELFARE; SPECTRUM ALLOCATION; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;

COSTS;

EID: 84919977312     PISSN: 10921648     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ICNP.2014.45     Document Type: Conference Paper

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