Auctions with online supply

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 13-22

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Blumrosen, Liad ^b   Roth, Aaron ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

approximation; mechanism design; online supply; truthful auction

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTIONAL INFORMATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL LOWER BOUND; PAYMENT DECISION; SHARP CONTRAST; SOCIAL WELFARE; SUPPLY DISTRIBUTIONS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION; STOCHASTIC MODELS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954721425     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807345     Document Type: Conference Paper

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