Envy, truth, and profit

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 243-252

  Hartline, Jason ^a   Yan, Qiqi ^b  

^a Northwestern University   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

envy free pricing; optimal auction; prior free; revenue maximization; truthful mechanisms

Indexed keywords

ENVY-FREE PRICING; OPTIMAL AUCTION; PRIOR-FREE; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; MACHINE DESIGN; OPTIMIZATION; SEARCH ENGINES;

PROFITABILITY;

EID: 79959581331     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993612     Document Type: Conference Paper

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