Persistence through function preservation

Synthese

Volumn 192, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 97-146

  Rose, David ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Debunking; Folk judgments; Persistence; Teleology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84914706213     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0555-6     Document Type: Article

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