Embedding organizational arrangements: Towards a general model

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 567-589

  Ménard, Claude ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84910143390     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137414000228     Document Type: Article

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