An institutional theory of public contracts: Regulatory implications

Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation: Institutional Perspectives

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 45-66

  Spiller, Pablo T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881918874     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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