Hybrid organizations

The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 176-184

  Ménard, Claude ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871215062     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

1. Cheung, S. (1983), 'The contractual nature of the firm', Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (1), 1-22.
2. Coase, R.H. (1937), 'The nature of the firm', Economica, 2 (1), 386-405.
3. Greif, A. (1993), 'Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders', American Economic Review, 83 (3), 525-47.
4. Macaulay, S. (1963), 'Non- contractual relations in business. A preliminary study', American Sociological Review, 28 (1), 55-67.
5. Ménard, Claude (2004), 'The economics of hybrid organizations', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160 (3), 345-76.
6. Raynaud, E. (1997), Propriété et exploitation partagée d'une marque commerciale: aléas contractuels et ordre privé, PhD dissertation, Université de Paris (Panthéon- Sorbonne).
7. Ryall, M.D. and R.C. Sampson (2006), 'Do prior alliances influence contract structure? Evidence from technology alliance contracts', in A. Arino and J. Reuer (eds), Strategic Alliances: Governance and Contracts, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 206-16.
8. Simon, H.A. (1951), 'A formal theory of the employment relationship', Econometrica, 19 (3), 293-305.
9. Williamson, O.E. (1991), 'Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), 269-96.