The future of new institutional economics: From early intuitions to a new paradigm?

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 541-565

  Ménard, Claude ^a   Shirley, Mary M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^b Ronald Coase Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84910154565     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S174413741400006X     Document Type: Article

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